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Cost o v e r r u n s  c o n t i n u e  t o  p lague  t h e  weapon sys tems  a c q u i s i t i o n  pro- 
c e s s ,  d e s p i t e  r e p e a t e d  e f f o r t s  over  t h e  l a s t  twenty y e a r s  t o  a l l e v i a t e  t h e  
problem. T h i s  paper reviews t h e  i n i t i a t i v e s  of t h e  Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
t o  c o n t r o l  c o s t  over runs  d u r i n g  t h e  l a s t  2-112 y e a r s  and t h e  a c t i o n s  t a k e n  
by t h e  Congress t o  s t r e n g t h e n  i t s  o v e r s i g h t  r o l e .  P a r t i c u l a r  a t t e n t i o n  i s  
d i r e c t e d  a t  t h e  c r i t i c a l  need t o  enhance management i n c e n t i v e  and account -  
a b i l i t y  a t  a l l  l e v e l s  of t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  p r o c e s s .  I f  r e c e n t l y  i n s t i t u t e d  
reforms i n  t h e  Department of Defense f a i l  t o  c o n t r o l  c o s t  o v e r r u n s ,  p r e s s u r e  
may grow f o r  a  more sweeping and r a d i c a l  approach.  S e r i o u s  c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  
i n  such an  e v e n t ,  might even be g iven  t o  removing r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  weapons 
a c q u i s i t i o n  management from t h e  m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e s  and a s s i g n i n g  i t  t o  a  





The r e s u l t s  o f  p a s t  e f f o r t s  t o  reduce c o s t  o v e r r u n s  i n  major weapon 
systems have been a lmost  uniformly regarded as u n s u c c e s s f u l  and t h e r e  i s  
widespread s k e p t i c i s m  r e g a r d i n g  Reagan Admin is t ra t ion  e f f o r t s  t o  s o l v e  t h e  
problem. A major Zeason f o r  t h i s ,  accord ing  t o  knowledgeable a n a l y s t s ,  i s  
t h a t  h i g h l e v e l  c o r r e c t i v e  d e c i s i o n s  a r e  n o t  a c t u a l l y  implemented a t  working 
l e v e l s .  Th i s  r e s i s t a n c e  t o  implementat ion i s  a  key o b s t a c l e  t o  s u c c e s s f u l  
reform of t h e  weapon systems a c q u i s i t i o n  p r o c e s s  and c o n t r o l  o f  c o s t  growth.  
Former Deputy S e c r e t a r y  of Defense Frank C. C a r l u c c i  expressed  p a r t i c u l a r  
concern i n  t h i s  r egard  i n  a  year-end r e p o r t  ( d a t e d  J u l y  15,  1982) on D O D ' s  
a c q u i s i t i o n  improvement program: 
While i m p a t i e n t  f o r  improvements, we  r e c o g n i z e  t h a t  
c u l t u r a l  change i n  a  v a s t  o r g a n i z a t i o n  t a k e s  some t ime .  
Our c h a l l e n g e  i s  t o  i n c o r p o r a t e  t h e  i n i t i a t i v e s  i n  t h e  
day-to-day o p e r a t i o n s  and d e c i s i o n  p r o c e s s e s  of t h e  
Department.  Th i s  r e q u i r e s  p u b l i c i z i n g  t h e  i n i t i a t i v e s  
t o  e n s u r e  a  c l e a r  unders tand ing  a t  a l l  l e v e l s ,  a s  w e l l  
a s  overcoming t h e  normal o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  r e s i s t a n c e  t o  
change. 
Reform e f f o r t s  have f a i l e d  i n  l a r g e  p a r t  because  of t h e  l a c k  of 
a p p r o p r i a t e  i n c e n t i v e s  and requirement  f o r  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  n e c e s s a r y  t o  
e n s u r e  proper  implementat ion.  A c c o u n t a b i l i t y ,  accord ing  t o  c r i t i c s ,  i s  
d i f f u s e d  throughout  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  p r o c e s s .  I n c e n t i v e s  a r e  non-ex i s ten t  
o r  improper ly  d i r e c t e d .  A s  one example, many c r i t i c s  i n s i s t  t h a t  t h e  
a c q u i s i t o n  p r o c e s s ,  enecurzges and rewards t h e  d e s i g n  of complex and 
expens ive  sys tems and p e n a l i z e s  work on s imple r  and l e s s  expens ive  o n e s ,  and 
does  f a r  t o o  l i t t l e  t o  e n s u r e  h i g h - q u a l i t y ,  low-cost performance on t h e  p a r t  
of d e f e n s e  c o n t r a c t o r s .  Th i s  i n c e n t i v e s  and a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  "gap," i t  h a s  
been a s s e r t e d ,  i s  found at  a l l  l e v e l s  -- t h e  Congress and i t s  o v e r s i g h t  
committees,  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  l a y e r s  of DOD, and t h e  many d e f e n s e - r e l a t e d  
i n d u s t r i e s  and s u p p l i e r s .  There  i s  no s i n g l e  i n d i v i d u a l  o r  group p r i m a r i l y  
r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  d e f i c i e n c i e s  j u s t  d e s c r i b e d .  
During t h e  l a s t  two y e a r s ,  t h e  Congress has  t aken  some s i g n i f i c a n t  
a c t i o n s  t o  curb  t h e  s h a r p l y  e s c a l a t i n g  c o s t  of weapon systems.  The main 
f o c u s  has  been t o  impose more s t r i n g e n t  DOD r e p o r t i n g  requirements  on major 
weapon systems. Other r e c e n t  i n i t i a t i v e s  t h a t  d e s e r v e  mention a r e  (1) t h e  
congress ional ly-mandated e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of a n  I n s p e c t o r  G e n e r a l ' s  o f f i c e  i n  
DOD t o  a u d i t  and i n v e s t i g a t e  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  a c t i v i t i e s  of t h e  depar tment  
and d e f e n s e  c o n t r a c t o r s ;  and ( 2 )  t h e  Congress' approva l  o f  t h e  wider u s e  of 
mul t i -year  c o n t r a c t s  a s  a  means of encouraging g r e a t e r  e f f i c i e n c y  and lower 
c o s t  i n  t h e  p roduc t ion  o f  c e r t a i n  weapons systems. 
Without e f f e c t i v e  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  o v e r s i g h t ,  f a c t o r s  t h a t  compete w i t h  
and undermine c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o f  c o s t  and e f f i c i e n c y  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  p r e v a i l .  
The Congress i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  important  i n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  e f f e c t i v e  account-  
a b i l i t y  throughout  t h e  d e f e n s e  a c q u i s i t i o n  p rocess .  Quest ions  have t h e r e f o r e  
been r a i s e d  a s  t o  whether t h e  Congress i s  organ ized  and s t a f f e d  a d e q u a t e l y  
t o  c a r r y  o u t  i t s  o v e r s i g h t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  i n  t h e  weapons a c q u i s i t i o n  a r e a .  
Is more a n a l y t i c a l  c a p a b i l i t y  r e q u i r e d ?  I f  so ,  should  t h e  requirement  be 
met by i n c r e a s i n g  u t i l i z a t i o n  o f  s u p p o r t i n g  a g e n c i e s ,  such a s  t h e  General  
Accounting O f f i c e  and t h e  Congress ional  Budget Offi-e? Is t h z  p r e s 2 n t  
committee s t r u c t u r e  b e s t  s u i t e d  t o  p r o v i d e  t h e  c l o s e  o v e r s i g h t  needed t o  
e n s u r e  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  from d e f e n s e  o f f i c i a l s  a s  w e l l  a s  o t h e r s ?  
There a r e  o b s e r v e r s  who b e l i e v e  t h a t  o n l y  major s t r u c t u r a l  change i n  
t h e  U.S. Government's procedure  f o r  buying weapons w i l l  s o l v e  t h e  problem o f  
c o s t  over runs .  Thus f a r ,  advoca tes  of s t r u c t u r a l  change have tended t o  focus  
on r e l a t i v e l y  modest r e v i s i o n  of D O D ' s  e x i s t i n g  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  w i t h  t h e  aim 
of impar t ing  g r e a t e r  o b j e c t i v i t y  and e f f e c t i v e n e s s  t o  i t s  weapons buying 
o p e r a t i o n s .  L i t t l e  o r  no a t t e n t i o n  has  been d i r e c t e d  a t  more sweeping s t r u c -  
t u r a l  change o u t s i d e  t h e  c u r r e n t  DOD framework -- such a s  t h e  o p t i o n  of 
removing t h e  major r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  a c q u i s i t i o n  management from t h e  m i l i t a r y  
s e r v i c e s  and a s s i g n i n g  i t  t o  a  c i v i l i a n - o p e r a t e d  supp ly  agency. 
On p a s t  o c c a s i o n s  when t h e  c i v i l i a n  supp ly  agency concep t  h a s  s u r f a c e d ,  
most n o t a b l y  d u r i n g  World War I and World War 11, i t  has  been r e j e c t e d  by 
b o t h  m i l i t a r y  l e a d e r s  and P r e s i d e n t s .  I t s  f u t u r e  p r o s p e c t s  p r o b a b l y  depend 
t o  a  l a r g e  e x t e n t  on whether o r  n o t  t h e  c u r r e n t  a c q u i s i t i o n  r e f o m  e f f o r t s  
succeed i n  b r i n g i n g  c o s t  over runs  under c o n t r o l .  
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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUE 
A. A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  Dec i s ion  t o  I n c r e a s e  Defense Spending 
Among t h e  e a r l i e s t  major p o l i c y  i n i t i a t i v e s  o f  t h e  Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
w a s  t h e  d e c i s i o n  t o  i n c r e a s e  s h a r p l y  t h e  l e v e l  of d e f e n s e  spend ing .  The 
c o u n t r y ' s  new l e a d e r s h i p  viewed U.S. m i l i t a r y  p reparedness  a s  s e r i o u s l y  d e f i -  
c i e n t  and i n  need of s t r e n g t h e n i n g ,  a  c o n d i t i o n  which had a r i s e n  from long- 
term n e g l e c t  d u r i n g  t h e  Vietnam War and subsequent  d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t  w i t h  
American m i l i t a r y  involvement abroad.  Not everyone s h a r e d  t h e  Reagan Admini- 
s t r a t i o n ' s  p e r s p e c t i v e  i n  t h i s  r e g a r d .  I n  t h e  Congress,  fundamental  q u e s t i o n s  
of a f f o r d a b i l i t y  and p r i o r i t y  have been r a i s e d .  Can t h e  c o u n t r y ,  a t  t h i s  t i m e  
of  economic s t r e s s ,  a f f o r d  t o  d i r e c t  such  l a r g e  sums of  money i n t o  m i l i t a r y  
programs? Are t h e s e  e x p e n d i t u r e s  j u s t i f i a b l e  when i t  means reduced fund ing  f o r  
v a r i o u s  s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  and economic suppor t  programs? The c o n t r o v e r s i a l i t y  o f  
t h e  Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  d e f e n s e  spending i n i t i a t i v e  i s  f u r t h e r  h e i g h t e n e d  
by a  long h i s t o r y  o f  d e f e n s e  sys tems c o s t  over runs .  
B. Exp lana t ion  o f  t h e  P a p e r ' s  Purpose ,  Scope,  and Approach 
This  paper  f o c u s e s  on t h e  c o n t i n u i n g  need t o  s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  r o l e  o f  man- 
agement i n c e n t i v e s  and a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  throughout  t h e  d e f e n s e  a c q u i s i t i o n  pro- 
c e s s .  A common theme i n  d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  c o s t  over runs  i s  t h a t  bo th  t h e i r  c a u s e s  
and p o t e n t i a l  remedies have been i d e n t i f i e d ,  and i n  some c a s e s  p o l i c y  changes  
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have been decreed .  The r e s u l t s  have been d i s a p p o i n t i n g  so f a r ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  
t h e  c r i t i c s ,  because  of inadequa te  implementat ion a t  t h e  o p e r a t i n g  l e v e l ,  
r e s u l t i n g  from a  t o t a l l y  inadequa te  i n c e n t i v e  s t r u c t u r e  and system of account-  
a b i l i t y .  
T h i s  paper  p rov ides  a n  overview of  p r e s e n t  i n i t i a t i v e s  aimed a t  b r i n g i n g  
c o s t  over runs  under c o n t r o l ,  and h i g h l i g h t s  a t t e m p t s  by t h e  Congress and t h e  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  t o  c o r r e c t  d e f i c i e n c i e s  i n  management i n c e n t i v e  and account-  
a b i l i t y .  Quest ions  r a i s e d  inc lude :  What a r e  t h e  broad c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  and 
dimensions  o f  t h e  problem? Why has  i t  been d i f f i c u l t  t o  i n t r o d u c e  more 
i n c e n t i v e  and a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  i n t o  t h e  system? How do t h e  p r e s e n t  e f f o r t s  a t  
reform d i f f e r  from p a s t  e f f o r t s ?  What a r e  t h e  p r o s p e c t s  f o r  s u c c e s s ?  Are 
t h e r e  measures n o t  p r e s e n t l y  being pursued which could  and shou ld  be t a k e n ?  
C. Cost  Overruns a  Longstanding and Complex I s s u e  
The c u r r e n t  i n t e r e s t  i n  c o s t  over runs  i s  n o t  a  new phenomenon. Concern 
o v e r  waste  and e x c e s s i v e  c o s t s  has  been a p r e d i c t a b l e  f e a t u r e  o f  each y e a r ' s  
DOD budget  d e b a t e  f o r  decades.  Under t h e  prodding of t h e  Congress,  p r a c t i c a l l y  
e v e r y  S e c r e t a r y  of Defense dur ing  t h e  l a s t  twenty y e a r s  has  a t t empted  t o  
reform t h e  weapons a c q u i s i t i o n  process .  It i s  t h e  consensus  of t h o s e  who f o l -  
low t h e  i s s u e ,  however, t h a t  t h e s e  e f f o r t s  have n o t  succeeded v e r y  w e l l  -- t h a t  
c o s t  growth c o n t i n u e s  t o  be e x c e s s i v e  and d e t r i m e n t a l  t o  t h e  p roper  management 
o f  t h e  d e f e n s e  budget.  There i s  d i sagreement ,  however, over  t h e  a c t u a l  e x t e n t  
of c o s t  over runs  and whether they have g o t t e n  worse i n  r e c e n t  years .  Sena tor  
Will iam Roth dur ing  1981 h e a r i n g s  on t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  p r o c e s s ,  s t a t e d  t h a t  
c o s t  growth i n  major weapon systems had "skyrocketed."  He suppor ted  h i s  c l a i m  
by citing data showing that the difference between the initial cost estimate 
and current cost estimate in any given year for major systems had gone from 
an average of 31 percent in 1969 to 190 percent in 1981. - 1/ On the other 
hand, Alice M. Rivlin, Director of the Congressional Budget Office, testified 
before the same committee six months later that: 
In fact, the attention paid to cost growth over the past 
three decades has apparently met with some success: net 
of inflation and adjusted for quantity change, cost 
growth in weapons systems during the 1970s was only 
about half as great as that during the 1950s and 1960s. 
Nevertheless, the typical weapon system entering devel- 
opment today can still be expected to experience real 
cost growth totaling about 50 percent by the time the 
system is introduced into service. - 2 /  
This latter assessment of cost growth reflects adjustments for inflation and 
quantity changes, which are presumed not to reflect unfavorably on DOD's 
efficiency and performance in the procurement of weapon systems. These two 
different appraisals of the cost growth problem reveal the difficulty of 
assessing the extent and significance of cost overruns. Many factors interact 
to create cost growth. Some are "uncontrollable ," meaning that DOD and 
industry are able to exercise little or no influence on them. An often-cited 
example of this is inflation in the general economy. Other factors contribut- 
ing to cost growth are "controllable," such as quantity or specification 
changes or inaccurate initial estimates of program costs, and these may or 
-------------- 
11 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. Acqui- 
sition Process in the Department of Defense. Hearings, 97th Congress, 1st 
session. October 21, 27, and November 5, 1981. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. 
Off., 1981. 7. 2. 
2 /  U.S. Congressional Budget Office. Statement of Alice M. Rivlin 
before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs during hearings on 
congressional oversignt of acquisition management in the Department a f  
Defense. April 22, 1982. pp. 1-2. 
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may not  r e f l e c t  adversely on the  i n t e g r i t y  and e f f i c i e n c y  of DODIindustry 
management. 
Given t h e  complexity of t h e  problem and pas t  f a i l u r e s  t o  br ing cos t  
growth under c o n t r o l ,  i t  may be f i t t i n g  t o  ask what prospects  e x i s t  f o r  t he  
success  of t h e  cu r r en t  endeavor. Pess imis t s  po in t  t o  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  and 
behaviora l  obs t ac l e s  t o  s i g n i f i c a n t  reform of t he  a c q u i s i t i o n  process.  
They argue  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  deeply ingrained b i a s  throughout t h e  dec i s i cmak ing  
h ie rarchy  f o r  high performance, se rv ice-spec ia l ized  systems, with cos t  con- 
s i d e r a t i o n s  r e l ega t ed  t o  low p r i o r i t y .  
Opt imis t s ,  on t h e  o the r  hand, while acknowledging pas t  f a i l u r e s ,  s ee  
hope f o r  succes s fu l  cos t  overrun reform i n  recent  economic and p o l i t i c a l  
changes. They point  t o  t he  recent  recess ion  a s  a s i g n i f i c a n t  s h i f t  i n  t h e  
o v e r a l l  s e t t i n g  and one t h a t  has  made Americans more s e n s i t i v e  than a t  any 
time i n  almost f i f t y  years  t o  t he  ways i n  which t h e i r  t a x  d o l l a r s  a r e  being 
spent .  
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11. CONTEXT AND CAUSES OF DEFENSE COST OVERRUNS 
A. Difference between "Cost Growth and "Cost Overrun" 
"Cost overrun" and "cost growth" are closely related but not synonymous. 
"Cost overrun" refers to cost in excess of an initial contract estimate or 
target figure. It is directly related to estimating error and, as such, is 
often the most visible aspect of the large cost growth issue. "Cost growth" 
refers to the general, overall increase in program costs from one generation of 
systems to the next. It is possible by means of accurately estimating program 
costs in advance, to eliminate cost overruns and still have excessive cost 
growth. Furthermore, there are desirable causes of cost growth, such as 
incorporation of essential new technology. A/ This paper examines important 
factors that contribute to both rising costs of major weapon systems and to 
the DOD and industry underestimation of these increases. 
B. Extent and Sienificance of Defense Cost Overruns 
As previously noted, the extent of the cost overrun problem depends on 
how figures are calculated and with what they are compared. For example, a 
May 1982 Congressional Budget Office review of DOD's quarterly Selected 
Acquisition Report (SAR) dated December 31, 1982, revealed that the 47 major 
-------------- 
3/ Power, John R. (Jr.). A Cost Growth Primer. Concepts, Spring f982. 
p .  94: 
d e f e n s e  programs con ta ined  i n  t h e  r e p o r t  exper ienced  t h e  l a r g e s t  q u a r t e r l y  
i n c r e a s e  e v e r  r e p o r t e d  -- $150.1 b i l l i o n  i n  c u r r e n t  d o l l a r s  o r  a 50 p e r c e n t  
i n c r e a s e  i n  a p e r i o d  of on ly  t h r e e  months. 41 However, t h e  d e c i s i o n  t o  - 
procure  a d d i t i o n a l  q u a n t i t i e s  of t h e  sys tems l i s t e d  accounted f o r  66 p e r c e n t  
of t h e  t o t a l ;  dropping one program and adding a n o t h e r  accounted f o r  19 per- 
c e n t ;  and o n l y  15 p e r c e n t  o r  $22.7 b i l l i o n  o f  t h e  t o t a l  i n c r e a s e  was t h e  
r e s u l t  of c o s t  growth caused by f a c t o r s  o t h e r  t h a n  q u a n t i t y  changes o r  addi-  
t i o n s  and d e l e t i o n s  of programs. The o t h e r  f a c t o r s  r e f e r r e d  t o  i n  t h e  CBO 
review were i d e n t i f i e d  a s  e n g i n e e r i n g ,  e s t i m a t i n g ,  schedu le ,  economic, sup- 
p o r t ,  and o t h e r  changes.  
Another means o f  measuring t r e n d s  i n  de fense  c o s t  over runs  i s  t o  compare 
DOD wi th  non-DOD government programs. I n  t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  many c i v i l i a n  programs 
have f a r e d  worse t h a n m i l i t a r y  ones .  F i g u r e s  provided i n  an A p r i l  1982 r e p o r t  
t o  t h e  Congress by t h e  General  Accounting O f f i c e  r e v e a l  t h a t  137 DOD p r o j e c t s  
d i d  b e t t e r  on a n  average  t h a n  239 c i v i l i a n  agency p r o j e c t s  surveyed. 5 /  The - 
average  i n c r e a s e  i n  c o s t  from t h e  i n i t i a l  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  budget e s t i m a t e s  w a s  
132 p e r c e n t  f o r  d e f e n s e  programs and 175 p e r c e n t  f o r  non-defense programs. 
I n  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  of i t s  r e p o r t ,  GAO recommended t h a t  non-defense a g e n c i e s  
be  r e q u i r e d  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a r e p o r t i n g  system f o r  major a c q u i s i t i o n  similar t o  
D O D ' s  a s  a means of h e l p i n g  t o  minimize c o s t  growth i n  c i v i l i a n  p r o j e c t s .  
------------- 
4 1  U.S. Congress iona l  Budget O f f i c e .  A Review of  t h e  Department of 
~ e f e n s e  December 31,  1981 S e l e c t e d  A c q u i s i t i o n  Report  (SAR) . S p e c i a l  Study,  
May 1982. pp. 2-6. 
5 1  U.S. General  Accounting O f f i c e .  S t a t u s  of Major A c q u i s i t i o n s  a s  
of ~ e T t e m b e r  30,  1981: B e t t e r  Report ing E s s e n t i a l  t o  C o n t r o l l i n g  Cost Growth. 
Report  No. MASAD-82-94, A p r i l  22 ,  1982. p. 8. 
D e s p i t e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  d e f e n s e  sys tems c o s t  over runs  a r e  s m a l l e r  i n  
s c a l e  t h a n  over runs  i n  some non-defense a r e a s  of procurement ,  t h e r e  a r e  
two f a c t o r s  t h a t  draw s p e c i a l  a t t e n t i o n  t o  m i l i t a r y  programs. A t  a  t ime  
of major c u t s  i n  s o c i a l  programs, t h e  "guns v e r s u s  b u t t e r "  d e b a t e  h a s  
become more i n t e n s e .  Also,  t h e  s h e e r  magnitude of DOD e x p e n d i t u r e s  i s  
immense compared t o  most c i v i l i a n  programs. For example, each  new T r i d e n t  
n u c l e a r  m i s s i l e  submarine i s  expected t o  c o s t  i n  t h e  v i c i n i t y  o f  $1.5-2 
b i l l i o n ,  w i t h  a  t o t a l  buy of 27 submarines and a  t o t a l  program c o s t  o f  
o v e r  $50 b i l l i o n .  Because of c o n t r o v e r s i a l i t y  and s c a l e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  DOD 
e f f i c i e n c y  i s  more c l o s e l y  s c r u t i n i z e d  t h a n  any o t h e r  f e d e r a l  agency. 
C. P r i n c i p a l  Causes o f  Defense Procurement Cost  Overruns 
There a r e  a  number o f  major c a u s e s  f o r  c o s t  growth i n  weapons develop- 
ment and p roduc t ion .  F i v e  impor tan t  c o n t r i b u t i n g  f a c t o r s  are i d e n t i f i e d  
i n  D O D ' s  q u a r t e r l y  S e l e c t e d  A c q u i s i t i o n  Repor t ing  (SAR) system. - 6 /  The 
SARs prov ide  i n f o r m a t i o n  on t h e  c o s t ,  s c h e d u l e ,  and t e c h n i c a l  performance 
o f  c e r t a i n  s e l e c t e d  d e f e n s e  a c q u i s i t i o n s .  The r e a s o n s  l i s t e d  f o r  c o s t  
growth i n  i n d i v i d u a l  systems a r e  a s  fo l lows :  
-- Low i n f l a t i o n  e s t i m a t e s  
-- Cost e s t i m a t i n g  e r r o r s  
-- Procurement schedu le  s l i p p a g e s  
-- Q u a n t i t y  changes 
-- Engineer ing  m o d i f i c a t i o n s  
------------- 
61 The l e g a l  r e p o r t i n g  requirement  f o r  SARs w a s  e s t a b l i s h e d  by sec-  
t i o n  gll ( a )  of t h e  Department of Defense A p p r o p r i a t i o n  A u t h o r i z a t i o n  Act 
of 1976 (P.L. 94-106). 
This  l i s t  i s  by no means complete ,  s i n c e  t h e r e  a r e  s e v e r a l  d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  
of c a u s a t i o n  t o  c o n s i d e r .  For example, procurement schedu le  s l i p p a g e s  (#3 
on t h e  above l i s t )  could  r e s u l t  from one o r  more of t h e  fo l lowing  f a c t o r s :  
-- Procurement budget i n s t a b i l i t y  
-- Lack of  compet i t ion  
-- High r i s k  system d e s i g n  
-- Defense i n d u s t r y  i n e f f i c i e n c i e s  
-- Excess ive  red  t a p e / r e g u l a t i o n s  
-- Poor c o n t r a c t  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
Other  t h a n  changes i n  q u a n t i t y ,  t h e  g r e a t  nemesis of c o s t  c o n t r o l  i n  
r e c e n t  y e a r s  appears  t o  be u n a n t i c i p a t e d  i n f l a t i o n .  CBO D i r e c t o r  A l i c e  
R i v l i n  has  s t a t e d  t h a t  u n a n t i c i p a t e d  i n f l a t i o n  accounted f o r  t h e  l a r g e s t  
s h a r e  of c u r r e n t - d o l l a r  c o s t  over runs .  71 A more c o n t r o l l a b l e  f a c t o r  - 
t h a t  competes w i t h  low i n f l a t i o n  e s t i m a t e s  a s  a  major c o n t r i b u t o r  t o  c o s t  
o v e r t r u n s  i s  t h e  p r a c t i c e  of con t inuous ly  upgrading q u a l i t a t i v e  r e q u i r e -  
ments. Ever s i n c e  t h e  end o f  World War 11, U.S. weapon d e s i g n  s t r a t e g y  
has  been t o  o f f s e t  enemy o r  q u a n t i t a t i v e  advantages  by s e e k i n g  and a t t a i n -  
i n g  q u a l i t a t i v e  s u p e r i o r i t y .  It i s  an expensive  s t r a t e g y  and one t h a t ,  
accord ing  t o  c r i t i c s ,  h a s  been fol lowed t o  excess .  A l a t e  1979 GAO r e p o r t  
on e f f o r t s  t o  curb  weapons c o s t  growth concluded w i t h  t h e  o b s e r v a t i o n  
t h a t :  " I n  our o p i n i o n ,  t h e  d e s i r e  of U.S. m i l i t a r y  l e a d e r s  t o  push t h e  
s t a te -o f - the -a r t  w i t h  new concep ts  and d e s i g n s  has  t h e  b i g g e s t  e f f e c t  on 
c o s t s . "  - 8 1  
--------------- 
7 1  U.S. Congress iona l  Budget O f f i c e .  Sta tement  of A l i c e  M. R i v l i n ,  - 
op. c i t . ,  p. 2.  
81 U.S. General  Accounting O f f i c e .  Impediments t o  Reducing t h e  Costs  
of weapons Systems. Report  No. PSAD-80-6, November 8 ,  1979.  p. 2 3 .  
D. Impor tan t  Role o f  I n c e n t i v e s  and A c c o u n t a b i l i t y  
I n i t i a t i v e s  t o  c o n t r o l  c o s t  o v e r r u n s ,  i n  t h e  o p i n i o n  o f  many a n a l y s t s ,  
have f a i l e d  i n  l a r g e  p a r t  because t h e  d e f e n s e  a c q u i s i t i o n  p rocess  l a c k s  
t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  i n c e n t i v e s  and requirement  f o r  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  which a r e  
necessa ry  t o  e n s u r e  t h e i r  proper  implementat ion.  " A c c o u n t a b i l i t y "  r e f e r s  
t o  t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of i n d i v i d u a l s  and o r g a n i z a t i o n s  and t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  
of t h e i r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  performing c e r t a i n  s p e c i f i e d  t a s k s  and a c h i e v i n g  
s u c c e s s f u l  r e s u l t s .  " I n c e n t i v e s "  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  v a r i e t y  of rewards  and 
punishments by which a c c o u n t a b l e  i n d i v i d u a l s  and o r g a n i z a t i o n s  may be 
mot iva ted  t o  perform t h e i r  d u t i e s  e f f e c t i v e l y .  
G i l b e r t  W. Fi tzhugh ,  chairman of t h e  Blue Ribbon Defense Pane l  t h a t  
s t u d i e d  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  p r o c e s s  i n  t h e  l a t e  1960s,  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  t h e  prob- 
lems of a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  i n  t h e  Department of Defense a s  fo l lows :  
Everybody i s  somewhat r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  e v e r y t h i n g ,  and 
nobody i s  compie+ely  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  any th ing .  So 
t h e r e ' s  no way o f  a s s i g n i n g  a u t h o r i t y ,  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  
and a c c o u n t a b i l i t y .  You c a n ' t  ho ld  anybody account-  
a b l e .  There  i s  nobody t h a t  you can  p o i n t  your f i n g e r  
t o  i f  any th ing  goes  wrong, and t h e r e  i s  nobody you 
can  p i n  a  medal on i f  i t  goes  r i g h t ,  because  every-  
t h i n g  i s  everybody 's  b u s i n e s s ,  and a s  you know, what 
i s  everybody 's  b u s i n e s s  is  nobody's b u s i n e s s .  - 9/ 
Another,  c l o s e l y - r e l a t e d  theme i n v o l v e s  non-ex i s ten t  o r  improper ly  
d i r e c t e d  i n c e n t i v e s .  For example, t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  p r o c e s s  a p p e a r s  t o  
encourage and reward t h e  d e s i g n  of complex and expens ive  sys tems and 
p e n a l i z e  work on s i m p l e r  and l e s s  expens ive  ones .  The c h a r g e  i s  a l s o  made 
91 Quoted i n :  Masey, Robert  J . ,  e t  a l .  Improving t h e  A c q u i s i t i o n  - 
System. Concepts,  Winter 1981.  p .  13. 
t h a t  t h e  p rocess  does  f a r  t o o  l i t t l e  t o  e n s u r e  h i g h - q u a l i t y ,  l o w c o s t  
performance on t h e  p a r t  of d e f e n s e  c o n t r a c t o r s .  It i s  n o t  c l e a r  t h a t  
companies which c o n s i s t e n t l y  do w e l l  a r e  supported whi le  those  which r e p e a t -  
e d l y  f a i l  f i n d  support  p r o g r e s s i v e l y  wi thhe ld .  101 -
Recen t ly ,  t h e  d i r e c t o r s  o f  b o t h  t h e  Congress ional  Budget O f f i c e  and t h e  
Genera l  Accounting O f f i c e  urged t h e  Congress t o  adop t  a two-year f e d e r a l  
budge t ing  and a p p r o p r i a t i o n s  c y c l e  i n  o'rder t o  g i v e  i t s e l f  more t i m e  t o  
o v e r s e e  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  branch.  Comptrol ler  General  Char les  A .  Bowsher t o l d  
t h e  Sena te  Budget Committee i n  h e a r i n g s  t h a t :  "Program a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  and 
o v e r s i g h t  a r e  two a r e a s  t h a t  have languished somewhat i n  t h e  l a s t  two y e a r s ,  
a s  t h e  budget deba te  has  dominated t h e  b u s i n e s s  of t h e  Congress ." 11/ He -
s i n g l e d  o u t  d e f e n s e  program spending and s a i d  t h a t  t h e  Congress shou ld  
d i s c i p l i n e  i t s e l f  wi th  review schedules  t o  determine t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of 
government a g e n c i e s  and programs. 
These  examples i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  l a c k  of adequa te  i n c e n t i v e s  and 
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  e x i s t s  a t  a l l  l e v e l s  of t h e  d e f e n s e  a c q u i s i t i o n  p rocess ,  
from t h e  Congress and i t s  o v e r s i g h t  committees down through s e v e r a l  admin- 
i s t r a t i v e  l a y e r s  i n  t h e  Department of Defense t o  t h e  l a r g e  and v a r i e d  
community o f  de fense- re la ted  i n d u s t r i e s  and s u p p l i e r s .  
101 Weapons A c q u i s i t i o n :  How F a u l t y  i s  Current  System? Congress iona l  
~ u a r t z l ~  Weekly Report ,  December 18,  1971. p. 2616. 
111 Washington Times, September 22, 1982, p.  3A. -
111. CURRENT INITIATIVES TO CURB COST OVERRUNS 
A .  Congress iona l  E f f o r t s  t o  Improve t h e  A c q u i s i t i o n  P r o c e s s  
On C a p i t o l  H i l l ,  a  three-pronged approach has  been adopted t o  d e a l  
w i t h  c o s t  growth. F i r s t ,  DOD r e p o r t i n g  requ i rements  on weapons c o s t s  have 
been r e f i n e d  and expanded t o  p rov ide  t h e  Congress wi th  more a c c u r a t e  and 
t i m e l y  i n f o r m a t i o n  on which t o  base  fund ing  d e c i s i o n s .  Second, t h e  Congress 
h a s  expressed  i t s  i n t e n t i o n  t o  moni tor  i n d i v i d u a l  programs more c l o s e l y  
through t h e  i n c r e a s e d  u s e  of committee s t a f f  and l e g i s l a t i v e  s u p p o r t  a g e n c i e s  
(GAO and CBO). Th i rd ,  t h e  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  reform e f f o r t  h a s  i n c l u d e d  passage  
o f  new l e g i s l a t i o n  aimed a t  improving t h e  e f f i c i e n c y  and c o s t  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  
of i n d u s t r y ' s  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e  d e f e n s e  a c q u i s i t i o n  p rocess .  Perhaps  
t h e  most v i s i b l e  p r o v i s i o n  i n  t h i s  l a s t  r e g a r d  proposed and passed d u r i n g  
t h e  p a s t  two y e a r s  was an  amendment t o  t h e  Department of Defense A u t h o r i z a t i o n  
Act o f  1981 which p e r m i t t e d  i n c r e a s e d  use  of mul t i -year  c o n t r a c t s  f o r  t h e  
procurement o f  c e r t a i n  major systems. 
B.  Department o f  Defense A c q u i s i t i o n  Improvement Program 
The Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n i t i a t e d  a  c o n c e r t e d  e f f o r t  t o  re fo rm DOD 
management of weapons programs when i t  e n t e r e d  o f f i c e .  Formal ly  c a l l e d  t h e  
Defense A c q u i s i t i o n  Improvement Program, i t  became widely  and p o p u l a r l y  
known a s  t h e  " C a r l u c c i  I n i t i a t i v e s , "  a f t e r  rhen Deputy S e c r e t a r y  s f  Defense 
Frank C .  C a r l u c c i .  Following a  month of p r e l i m i n a r y  rev iew and s t u d y ,  
Deputy S e c r e t a r y  C a r l u c c i  announced on A p r i l  30, 1981, t h e  d e c i s i o n  t o  make 
major changes i n  DOD a c q u i s i t i o n  phi losophy and t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  p r o c e s s  
i t s e l f .  A t o t a l  of 32 i n i t i a t i v e s  were i d e n t i f i e d .  12/ -
These measures f e l l  i n t o  s e v e r a l  c a t e g o r i e s  des igned  t o  ( 1 )  promote 
d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  and p a r t i c i p a t i v e  management, (2 )  improve p lann ing  and 
e x e c u t i o n  o f  weapon systems programs, ( 3 )  s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  base  
t h a t  s u p p o r t s  t h e  Department of Defense,  ( 4 )  i n c r e a s e  t h e  r e a d i n e s s  of weapon 
sys tems ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t h e  e a r l y  s t a g e s  of t h e i r  l i v e s  i n  t h e  f i e l d ,  and 
(5)  reduce t h e  burdensome a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  requirements  t h a t  make t h e  a c q u i s i -  
t i o n  p rocess  more c o s t l y  and time-consuming. - 13/ 
D e s p i t e  o t h e r  s p e c i f i c  g o a l s ,  such a s  improving t e c h n i c a l  r e l i a b i l i t y  and 
reduc ing  long lead- t imes i n  d e l i v e r y  o f  weapon systems,  t h e  o v e r r i d i n g  concern  
of t h e  C a r l u c c i  i n i t i a t i v e s  seemed t o  be t h a t  of c o n t r o l l i n g  c o s t  growth. 
While t h e  C a r l u c c i  i n i t i a t i v e s  r e p r e s e n t  a broad and ambi t ious  a t t a c k  on 
t h e  c o s t  over run  problem, knowledgeable o b s e r v e r s  have po in ted  o u t  t h a t  
t h e  u l t i m a t e  s u c c e s s  of t h e  e f f o r t  w i l l  depend g r e a t l y  on overcoming long- 
s t a n d i n g  o b s t a c l e s  t o  implementat ion.  This  c h a l l e n g e  has  been r e a d i l y  
acknowledged by t h e  DOD l e a d e r s h i p .  During h e a r i n g s  b e f o r e  t h e  S p e c i a l  
Pane l  on Defense Procurement Procedures  i n  l a t e  1981, Deputy S e c r e t a r y  of 
Defense C a r l u c c i  t o l d  t h e  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  group t h a t :  
12/  The l a s t  i n i t i a t i v e  which aims a t  i n c r e a s i n g  compet i t ion  (1 j32)  was 
a d d e d 7 0  t h e  o r i g i n a l  l i s t  of 31 on J u l y  2 7 ,  1981, a t  t h e  i n s i s t e n c e  of t h e  
Congress.  
13/  Brabson, G. Dana. Department of Defense A c q u i s i t i o n  Improvement 
progr=. Concepts,  Autumn 1981. p. 10. 
When we announced our new initiatives, we recognized 
the problem of implementation and admitted it was as 
important as the decisions themselves. We recognized 
fully that not only had the acquisition process been 
studied numerous times, but many of our initiatives 
had been tried before and never really got very 
far. 141 -
No attempt is made in this paper to examine all the specific actions 
taken or planned to curb cost overruns. Instead, four of the more important 
initiatives will be analyzed, focusing on how each compares with similar 
efforts in the past and what provisions they include to overcome longstanding 
obstacles to implementation. 
The initiative to receive the most attention has been the effort to 
achieve more realism in estimating costs. Althoush greater accuracy in 
predicting costs does not in itself overcome the problem of rising prices 
for successive generations of weapon systems, it does contribute to a more 
economically rational assignment of priority in the purchase of these items. 
Budgeting to the most likely cost is an important first step along the 
path of successful reform of the defense acquisition process. 
Other actions and initiatives examined later in this paper include: 
(1) enhancement of the DOD program manager's role; (2) lessening the 
degree of U.S. reliance on high technology in the development of its 
weapon systems; and (3) imposition by the Congress of strict reporting 
requirements on weapon costs. 
-------------- 
141 U.S. Congress. Committee on Armed Services. Special Panel on -
Defense Procurement Procedures. Defense Procurement Policies and Procedures: 
Cssc Nanagement and Cancrol. Y e a r i n g s ,  97th Congress, 1st session, July 23, 
28, 30, September 10, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, October 7, 15, 20, 27 and 
28, 1981. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1981. p. 1086. 
C. Need f o r  More Realism i n  Es t imat ing  Cos t s  
Among t h e  f a c t o r s  wide ly  cons idered  t o  be most r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  
c o s t  over runs  i s  t h e  p r a c t i c e  of making u n r e a l i s t i c a l l y  low i n i t i a l  
c o s t  e s t i m a t e s .  I n  tes t imony b e f o r e  t h e  Sena te  Committee on Governmental 
A f f a i r s  on March 23,  1983, Deputy S e c r e t a r y  of Defense W .  Pau l  Thayer 
s t a t e d  t h a t  " u n r e a l i s t i c  c o s t  e s t i m a t i n g  i s  a  major c a u s e  of c o s t  growth." 
He went on t o  e x p l a i n  t h a t :  
I n  t h e  p a s t  we have been o v e r l y  o p t i m i s t i c  about  
t h e  p r o j e c t e d  o u t y e a r  c o s t s  of progruns .  The c o s t  
growth t h a t  r e s u l t s  from t h i s  optimism produced 
i n c r e a s i n g  i n s t a b i l i t y ,  s t r e t c h - o u t s ,  and more 
c o s t  i n c r e a s e s .  It i s  a  v i c i o u s  c y c l e  and a  
d i f f i c u l t  one t o  r e v e r s e .  151 -
Although a  c e r t a i n  degree  of e r r o r  must be expec ted ,  and a c c e p t e d ,  a s  a  
n a t u r a l  product of t h e  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  t h a t  accompany t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  of 
complicated systems over  a n  extended per iod  of t ime ,  t h e r e  i s  a lmost  unanimous 
agreement among defense  a n a l y s t s  t h a t  t h e  magnitude of e r r o r  f a r  exceeds  such 
j u s t i f i a b l e  l i m i t s .  Indeed,  i t  i s  wide ly  acknowledged t h a t  program c o s t s  a r e  
o f t e n  purpose ly  underes t imated e i t h e r  because t h e  c o n t r a c t o r s  a r e  lowering 
t h e i r  c o s t  e s t i m a t e s  i n  o r d e r  t o  win a  c o n t r a c t  wi th  hopes of recover ing  c o s t s  
on f o l l o r o n  c o n t r a c t s  ( a  p r a c t i c e  known a s  "buying-in") o r  because DOD i s  
f o r c i n g  a  program t o  f i t  a v a i l a b l e  funding r a t h e r  t h a n  p rov id ing  t h e  funding 
i t  t a k e s  t o  do t h e  job.  161 
-------------- 
151 U.S. Congress.  Sena te .  Committee on Governmental A f f a i r s .  Manage- 
ment of t h e  Department of Defense. Hearing,  98th  Congress,  1st s e s s i o n ,  P a r t  
1, March 23 ,  1983. Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  O f f . ,  1983. p. 66. 
161  U.S. Department o f  Defense. Deputy S e c r e t a r y  of Defense.  I n t e r n a l  - 
senoranduz  ~c :he 3ecr l , r -&r los of  t h e  a i l i t a r y  d e ~ a r t r n e n t s  and o t h e r s  on t h e  
s u b j e c t  of improving t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  p rocess ;  with a t t a c h e d  recommendation 
and i s s u e s  f o r  d e c i s i o n ,  A p r i l  30,  1981. p. 6 ( a t t a c h m e n t ) .  
It i s  wide ly  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  bo th  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  and l e g i s l a t i v e  b r a n c h e s  
o f  government have p e r m i t t e d  u n r e a l i s t i c a l l y  low i n i t i a l  e s t i m a t e s  f o r  pro- 
grams s o  t h a t  t h e  programs can be approved.  A noted  a u t h o r i t y  on t h e  d e f e n s e  
a c q u i s i t i o n  p r o c e s s ,  Jacques  S. G a n s l e r ,  p o i n t s  o u t  t h a t :  
As a r e s u l t ,  when c o s t s  b e g i n  t o  grow, o t h e r  programs 
a r e  c u t  back,  o r  t h e  s p e c i f i c  program i s  s t r e t c h e d  
o u t .  Th i s  i n  t u r n  c a u s e s  f u r t h e r  c o s t  i n c r e a s e s  
a c r o s s  t h e  board and c r e a t e s  f u r t h e r  c u t b a c k s ,  and 
on and on. The s o l u t i o n  would be t o  u s e  r e a l i s t i c  
numbers i n  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e ;  but  t h a t  i s  e x t r e m e l y  
d i f f i c u l t  because  many o t h e r  programs e i t h e r  cou ld  
n o t  be i n i t i a t e d ,  o r  would have t o  be t e r m i n a t e d  
( b o t h  d i f f i c u l t  a c t i o n s ) .  - 1 7 /  
P a s t  and p r e s e n t  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s  have focused  t h e i r  reform e f f o r t s  on 
two broad a s p e c t s  of t h e  c o s t  e s t i m a t i n g  p rocess :  
-- s t r e n g t h e n i n g  t h e  r o l e  of  independent  e s t i m a t o r s  i n  t h e  o v e r a l l  
p r o c e s s ;  and 
-- improving t h e  formulas  by which program c o s t  e s t i m a t e s  a r e  c a l c u l a t e d .  
Before  rev iewing  t h e s e  two a r e a s  i n  d e t a i l ,  i t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  d e s c r i b e  
t h e  c o s t  e s t i m a t i n g  procedure .  Each s e r v i c e  program manager (PM) g e n e r a t e s ,  
w i t h  t h e  a i d  of h i s  s t a f f ,  t h e  i n i t i a l  c o s t  e s t i m a t e  f o r  t h e  weapon sys tem 
under  h i s  purview. It i s  done a s  p a r t  of  t h e  on-going DSARC (Defense  Systems 
A c q u i s i t i o n  Review Counc i l )  decision-making p r o c e s s ,  which i n c l u d e s  c o n s i d e r -  
a t i o n  of many o t h e r  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  program, such  a s  m i s s i o n  need ,  c a p a b i l i t y ,  
t e c h n i c a l  r i s k s  and s o l u t i o n s ,  s u p p o r t  p l a n s ,  and c o n t r a c t u a l  s t r a t e g i e s .  
Concurrent  wi th  t h e  PM's development of  h i s  c o s t  e s t i m a t e ,  a second l i f e - c y c l e -  
c o s t  e s t i m a t e  i s  g e n e r a t e d  by an independent  u n i t  w i t h i n  t h e  same s e r v i c e .  
17 /  G a n s l e r ,  Jacques  S. Can t h e  Defense I n d u s t r y  Respond t o  t h e  
~ e a ~ a F i n i t i a t i v e s ?  i n t e r n a t i o n a i  S e c u r i t y ,  S p r i n g  i 9 8 2 .  p .  i09. 
The ground r u l e s  and b a s i c  assumptions  (e .g . ,  performance c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  
d e s i g n  f e a t u r e s ,  q u a n t i t i e s ,  s c h e d u l e s ,  e t c . )  e s t a b l i s h e d  by t h e  PM a r e  a l s o  
used by t h e  independent  c o s t  a n a l y s t .  However, t h e  approach and methodology 
employed t o  g e n e r a t e  program c o s t  e s t i m a t e s  by t h e  independent group may 
d i f f e r .  For example, t h e  PM may compute h i s  e s t i m a t e  u s i n g  t h e  " e n g i n e e r i n g  
method," which r e l i e s  on summarizing t h e  e s t i m a t e d  c o s t s  of d e t a i l e d  compo- 
n e n t s  of a  system. On t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e  independent  c o s t  u n i t  may choose 
t o  u t i l i z e  t h e  " s t a t i s t i c a l / p a r a m e t r i c  method," which proceeds  by e x t r a p o l a t -  
i n g  c o s t s  from t h e  a c t u a l  c o s t s  of p rev ious  systems and c o r r e l a t i n g  t h e s e  
c o s t s  wi th  d i f f e r e n t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  t h e  new system. 
A t  each major program d e c i s i o n  p o i n t ,  o r  " m i l e s t o n e , "  a l l  a s p e c t s  of t h e  
p a r t i c u l a r  weapon system are reviewed by t h e  DSARC. The m i l i t a r y  d e p a r t -  
ment concerned i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  submit two program c o s t  e s t i m a t e s  -- one prepared 
by t h e  r e l e v a n t  program manager and a n o t h e r  by t h e  independent c o s t  u n i t  
w i t h i n  t h e  department.  P r i o r  t o  t h e  meet ing of t h e  D S f f i C ,  however, t h e  two 
e s t i m a t e s  a r e  p resen ted  t o  t h e  Cost Ana lys i s  Improvement Group (CAIG), an 
o r g a n i z a t i o n  w i t h i n  t h e  O f f i c e  of t h e  S e c r e t a r y  of Defense whose primary 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i s  t o  rev iew s e r v i c e  c o s t  e s t i m a t e s  and p rov ide  a  second 
l e v e l  of independent  a n a l y s i s .  A memorandum f o r  t h e  DSARC i s  prepared by 
t h e  CAIG w i t h  i t s  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  t h e  two s e r v i c e  e s t i m a t e s .  A s  p o i n t e d  o u t  
by Mi l ton  A .  Margol i s ,  c u r r e n t  chairman of t h e  C A I G ,  t h e  independent  a s s e s s -  
ments by h i s  o r g a n i z a t i o n  and t h e  m i l i t a r y  department a r e  in tended  t o  encourage 
t h e  p r e p a r a t i o n  of a  r e a l i s t i c  and a c c u r a t e  e s t i m a t e  on t h e  p a r t  of t h e  
program manager. They may a l s o  s e r v e  as t h e  b a s i s  f o r  an a c t u a l  r e v i s i o n  of 
CRS-17 
t h e  PM's e s t i m a t e .  - 18/  I f  s u b s t a n t i a l  d isagreement  e x i s t s  over  t h e  e s t i m a t e d  
c o s t  o f  a program, t h e  DSARC chairman may r e q u e s t  t h e  program manager t o  
r e a s s e s s  and ,  i f  n e c e s s a r y ,  r e v i s e  p r o j e c t e d  c o s t  f i g u r e s .  The f i n a l  respon- 
s i b i l i t y ,  however, remains w i t h  t h e  program manager, whose e s t i m a t e  on t h e  
c o s t  of a program i s  t h e  one r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  DOD budget submiss ion t o  t h e  
Congress.  
1. S t r e n g t h e n i n g  Role o f  Independent E s t i m a t o r s  
A s i g n i f i c a n t  s t e p  t aken  i n  response  t o  t h e  need t o  e n s u r e  more a c c u r a t e  
e s t i m a t e s  occur red  i n  June 1.973 when t h e  Cost Ana lys i s  Improvement Group (CAIG) 
was e s t a b l i s h e d .  The CAIG w a s  g i v e n  t h e  d u a l  f u n c t i o n  of reviewing s e r v i c e  
c o s t  e s t i m a t e s  and f o s t e r i n g  defense-wide improvements i n  m i l i t a r y  c o s t  ana l -  
y s i s  c a p a b i l i t i e s .  In format ion  provided by w i t n e s s e s  a t  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  hear -  
i n g s  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t ,  a s  a r u l e ,  t h e  CAIG's independent  e s t i m a t e s  have proven 
o v e r  t h e  y e a r s  t o  be  more a c c u r a t e  t h a n  s e r v i c e  g e n e r a t e d  f i g u r e s  where t h e  two 
have d i f f e r e d .  - 19/ N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  i t  a p p e a r s  t h e s e  e s t i m a t e s  were f r e q u e n t l y  
ignored o r  r e j e c t e d  by t h e  program managers who were h e l d  i n d i v i d u a l l y  respon- 
s i b l e  f o r  t h e  s p e c i f i e d  programs. 
The c u r r e n t  DOD l e a d e r s h i p  has  moved t o  s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  CAIG a s  an  indepen- 
den t  c o s t  r ev iew group. A t  t h e  same t ime ,  t h e  s e r v i c e - l e v e l  independent  c o s t  
a n a l y s i s  g roups  have been g i v e n  more i n f l u e n c e  t h a n  b e f o r e .  The most i m p o r t a n t  
18/ Margo l i s ,  Mi l ton  A. Improving Cost E s t i m a t i n g  i n  t h e  Department o f  
~ e f e n z .  Concepts,  Spr ing  1981. p .  7 .  
19/  U.S. Congress.  Sena te .  Committee on Governmental A f f a i r s .  Acqui- 
s i t i o n ~ r o c e s s  i n  t h e  Department of Defense,  op. c i t  . , pp. 18-56. 
evidence of t h i s  i s  t h e  new requirement  t h a t  program managers must n o t  o n l y  
c o n s i d e r  independent  c o s t  e s t i m a t e s  i n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  t h e i r  budget e s t i m a t e s  b u t  
a l s o  j u s t i f y  t h e  u s e  of an e s t i m a t e  lower than  t h e  independent  one.  The s e r -  
v i c e  s e c r e t a r i e s ,  i n  t u r n ,  a r e  r e q u i r e d  t o  p rov ide  a n  e x p l a n a t i o n  of any 
d e c i s i o n  l e a d i n g  t o  a  cho ice  of a  budget based on t h e  lowest  e s t i m a t e  ( inde-  
pendent o r  program manager ' s ) ,  and t o  p rov ide  p l a n s  f o r  e n s u r i n g  t h e  lower 
f i g u r e  i s  met. - 20/ These requirements  have fo rced  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  t h e  weapons 
a c q u i s i t i o n  p r o c e s s  t o  pay c l o s e r  a t t e n t i o n  t o  c o s t  e s t i m a t e s  and t h e  need 
f o r  g r e a t e r  accuracy .  
A s  a  r e s u l t  of  r e c e n t  i n i t i a t i v e s ,  t h e  CAIG has  a l s o  begun t o  rev iew t h e  
c o s t s  o f  more weapons programs than  before .  P r e v i o u s l y ,  i t  had r e s t r i c t e d  i t s  
reviews t o  t h o s e  programs n e a r i n g  key DSARC m i l e s t o n e s .  Under new DOD d i r e c -  
t i v e s  i t  has  begun t o  focus  on a  much wider a r r a y  of programs. However, t h e  
i n c r e a s e d  workload o f  t h e  CAIG a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  r e p o r t s  requi;ed 
from t h e  PMs and s e r v i c e  s e c r e t a r i e s  i n  connec t ion  wi th  t h e i r  d e c i s i o n s  on 
c o s t  e s t i m a t e s  appears  t o  have c r e a t e d ,  a t  l e a s t  i n  t h e  s h o r t  r u n ,  a  substan-  
t i a l  burden on e x i s t i n g  s t a f f .  DOD c o s t  e s t i m a t i n g  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  need n o t  
o n l y  more p e r s o n n e l  b u t  a l s o  i n d i v i d u a l s  w e l l  t r a i n e d  i n  t h e  a rcane  f i e l d  of 
de fense  sys tems c o s t  a n a l y s i s .  A s  J. Ronald Fox s t r e s s e d  i n  Arming America: 
How t h e  U . S .  Buys Weapons (1974) :  
-------------- 
201 U.S. Department of Defense.  Deputy S e c r e t a r y  o f  Defense. I n t e r n a l  
memorzdum t o  t h e  s e c r e t a r i e s  of t h e  m i l i t a r y  depar tments  and o t h e r s  r e g a r d i n g  
guidance on t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  improvement program ( A I P ) ;  wi th  a t t a c h e d  second 
year-end r e p o r t  of t h e  A c q u i s i t i o n  Improvement S t e e r i n g  Group. June  8 ,  1983. 
p.  10 ( a t  t a c h e n t )  . 
Adequate c o s t  e s t i m a t i n g  c a p a b i l i t y  depends on t h e  a v a i l -  
a b i l i t y  o f  peop le  and methods f o r  making c o s t  e s t i m a t e s .  
It a l s o  depends on t h e  r e s p o n s i v e n e s s  of t h e s e  people  and 
methods t o  t h e  needs  o f  t h e  dec i s ionmakers  i n  t h e  s e r v i c e s  
and t h e  O f f i c e  o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  of Defense.  Cost e s t i m a t e s  
-- whether  f o r  new advanced technology sys tems ,  o r  f o r  
changes i n  sys tems a l r e a d y  i n  e x i s t e n c e  -- a r e  n o t  s t a t e -  
ments o f  f a c t .  Ra ther  t h e y  a r e  judgments o f  t h e  c o s t  o f  
work t o  be performed under c e r t a i n  s p e c i f i e d  c o n d i t i o n s .  
Consequently, .  i f  a decis ionmaker  i s  t o  c o n s i d e r  a n  e s t i m a t e  
r e l i a b l e  a t  any s t a g e  o f  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  p r o c e s s ,  h e  must 
have conf idence  i n  t h e  judgement of t h e  e s t i m a t o r  and t h e  
l i k e l i h o o d  t h a t  t h e  s p e c i f i e d  c o n d i t i o n s  w i l l  occur .  - 2 1 1  
2 .  Improving Cost E s t i m a t i n g  Methodologies 
Improving a n a l y t i c a l  methods f o r  c a l c u l a t i n g  t h e  l i f e - c y c l e  c o s t s  o f  
weapon systems has  been an  impor tan t  concern w i t h i n  DOD f o r  some t ime .  Annual 
c o s t  a n a l y s i s  symposiums have been sponsored t o  enhance t h e  p r o f e s s i o n a l  deve l -  
opment o f  c o s t  a n a l y s t s  and t o  promote more e f f e c t i v e  performance o f  t h e  c o s t  
a n a l y s i s  f u n c t i o n .  The Defense Systems Management Col lege  a t  F o r t  B e l v o i r ,  
V i r g i n i a ,  s t r e s s e s  c o s t  a n a l y s i s  t echn iques  a s  p a r t  of i t s  comprehensive 
t r a i n i n g  program f o r  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  p rocess .  D e s p i t e  t h e  
c o n s i d e r a b l e  a t t e n t i o n  i t  has  r e c e i v e d  o v e r  t h e  y e a r s ,  i t  i s  w i d e l y  acknowl- 
edged t h a t  e s t i m a t i n g  t h e  c o s t  of complex, t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y  advanced weapons 
remains an i m p e r f e c t  s c i e n c e ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t h e  e a r l y  s t a g e s  o f  sys tems  
d e s i g n  and development. There a r e  s imply Coo many unknowns and t o o  few 
d i r e c t l y  comparable c o n d i t i o n s  w i t h  o t h e r  sys tems t o  a c h i e v e  any r e a s o n a b l e  
degree  of accuracy  wi thou t  a l s o  f a c t o r i n g  i n t o  t h e  computat ions  t h e  e lement  
o f  r i s k  o r  u n c e r t a i n t y .  
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This  need has  been recognized  by DOD as r e f l e c t e d  i n  C a r l u c c i  i n i t i a t i v e  
U 1 1 ,  which recommended i n c r e a s e d  e f f o r t s  t o  q u a n t i f y  r i s k  and expand t h e  use  o f  
budgeted funds  t o  d e a l  wi th  u n c e r t a i n t y .  A l l  t h e  s e r v i c e s  have been d i r e c t e d  
t o  review t h e  Army's concept  f o r  r i s k  budget ing and e i t h e r  adopt  i t  o r  propose 
an  a l t e r n a t i v e  method. In t roduced  i n  1974, t h e  Army's TRACE program q u a n t i -  
f i e s  r i s k  and i n c l u d e s  funds  i n  t h e  budget t o  cover  t h e  e s t i m a t e d  c o s t  a s s o c i -  
a t e d  wi th  r i s k .  These r i s k  funds  a r e  c u r r e n t l y  h e l d  a t  t h e  s e r v i c e  headquar- 
t e r s  o r  a t  a  command l e v e l  and d i s t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  program manager a s  needed. 
I n  t h e  second year-end r e p o r t  on D O D f s  a c q u i s i t i o n  improvement program, 
d a t e d  June 8 ,  1983, s p e c i f i c  a c t i o n  t o  develop procedures  t o  budget f o r  
t e c h n o l o g i c a l  r i s k  w a s  d e c l a r e d  t o  have been implemented by t h e  s e r v i c e s .  The 
r e p o r t  e x p l a i n s  t h a t  t h e  Army and Navy have succeeded i n  i n s t i t u t i n g  TRACE; 
i n  t h e  c a s e  of t h e  Air Force s i m i l a r  t echn iques  have been used f o r  q u a n t i f y i n g  
r i s k ,  but  fund ing  i s  h e l d  a t  t h e  program manager 's  l e v e l .  - 221  
Much concern  has  been expressed over  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  of e n s u r i n g  t h e  f u l l  
b e n e f i t s  o f  t h i s  i n i t i a t i v e  because  WD and c o n g r e s s i o n a l  budget rev iewers  
have tended t o  look  upon TRACE funds  a s  f a i r  game f o r  d e l e t i o n  i n  t h e i r  
c o n s t a n t  b a t t l e  t o  t r i m  t h e  d e f e n s e  budget.  Thus, OSD and s e r v i c e  l e a d e r s  
a r e  being urged n o t  on ly  t o  e x e r c i s e  s e l f - r e s t r a i n t  bu t  a l s o  t o  work wi th  t h e  
c o n g r e s s i o n a l  a u t h o r i z a t i o n  and a p p r o p r i a t i o n  committees t o  win t h e i r  accep t -  
ance of r i s k  budget r e q u e s t s .  
-------------- 
2 2 1  U.S. Department o f  Defense. Deputy S e c r e t a r y  o f  Defense.  I n t e r n a l  
memorzdum d a t e d  June  8, 1983 ... , op. c i t  ., p. 16 ( a t t a c h m e n t ) .  
Even i f  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  r i s k  and u n c e r t a i n t y  a r e  c a l c u l a t e d  s u c c e s s f u l l y ,  
t h e  problem of i n a c c u r a t e  c o s t  e s t i m a t e s  is  . f a r  from s o l v e d .  The e n t i r e  
i n c e n t i v e  sys tem,  i n  t h e  view of  many a n a l y s t s ,  does no t  suppor t  d e s i r e d  
g o a l s  o f  r educ ing  c o s t  over runs .  I n i t i a l  c o s t  e s t i m a t e s  a r e  k e p t  low t o  
i n c r e a s e  t h e  chances  of funding f o r  weapons f e l t  t o  be c r u c i a l  t o  n a t i o n a l  
s e c u r i t y .  Respons ib le  o f f i c i a l s  a r e  aware from p a s t  e x p e r i e n c e  t h a t  t h e y  
w i l l  be rewarded more f o r  t h e  q u a l i t y  and t i m e l i n e s s  of t h e  weapons t h a n  f o r  
ho ld ing  down c o s t s .  Likewise ,  d e f e n s e  f i r m s  a r e  i n c l i n e d  t o  be l e s s  t h a n  
hones t  wi th  t h e i r  i n i t i a l  c o s t  e s t i m a t e s .  The p r a c t i c e  of "buying-in" i s  
endemic and c o n t r a c t o r s  know t h a t  t h e y  w i l l  n o t  be p e n a l i z e d  by t h e  U.S. 
Government f o r  p rov id ing  mis lead ing  f i g u r e s .  Most d e f e n s e  a n a l y s t s  concur  
t h a t  s u b s t a n t i a l  and c o n t i n u i n g  p r e s s u r e  from t h e  Congress i s  needed i f  
t h e r e  i s  t o  be any chance of p o s i t i v e  change i n  t h e  a r e a  o f  i n c e n t i v e s ;  t h e  
, . 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  i n e r t i a  and r e s i s t a n c e  t o  change i s  c o n s i d e r a b l e  -- both  i n  
DOD and i n  t h e  b u s i n e s s  world. 
D. Other E x a m ~ l e s  o f  I m ~ o r t a n t  I n i t i a t i v e s  
1. Enhance DOD Program Manager's Role 
One of t h e  b a s i c  p r i n c i p l e s  of D O D ' s  a c q u i s i t i o n  improvement p l a n  i s  
more d e l e g a t i o n  of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  and a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  f o r  weapons programs. 
The a c q u i s i t i o n  p r o c e s s ,  i n  t h e  view of many a n a l y s t s ,  i s  much t o o  d i v e r s e  
and complex t o  be managed on a h i g h l y  c e n t r a l i z e d  b a s i s .  A u t h o r i t y  i s  t o  b e  
d e l e g a t e d  t o  t h e  m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e s  t o  a  much g r e a t e r  d e g r e e ,  w i t h  a  concom- 
i t a n t  placement of a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  upon s p e c i f i c  i n d i v i d u a l s .  23/ -
23/ August ine ,  Norman R. J u s t  How Good/Bad Is t h e  Defense A c q u i s i t i o n  
~ r o c e z .  Government Execu t ive ,  February 1982. p. 32. 
I n  t h e  1950s t h e  management o f  weapons a c q u i s i t i o n  was a  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
d e c e n t r a l i z e d  p rocess .  The r e s u l t s  were d i s c o u r a g i n g .  Consequently,  d u r i n g  
t h e  1960s and 1970s,  s u c c e s s i v e  Admin is t ra t ions  sought t o  t i g h t e n  c o n t r o l  
o v e r  key a s p e c t s  of t h e  p r o c e s s .  The Reagan Admin is t ra t ion  i s  convinced,  
however, t h a t  p a s t  a t t e m p t s  a t  e s t a b l i s h i n g  d e t a i l e d ,  c e n t r a l i z e d  c o n t r o l  -- 
e s p e c i a l l y  by D O D ' s  c i v i l i a n  r e s e a r c h  and e n g i n e e r i n g  community - have done 
more harm than  good. Thus, DOD i s  now i n t e n t  on implementing what i s  c a l l e d  
" c o n t r o l l e d  d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , "  under which s u b o r d i n a t e  e x e c u t i v e s ,  espe- 
c i a l l y  s e r v i c e  managers, w i l l  be h e l d  accountab le  f o r  implementat ion of 
p o l i c y  d e c i s i o n s  reached by t h e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  Defense.  A s  exp la ined  by former 
Deputy S e c r e t a r y  o f  Defense C a r l u c c i ,  t h e  key i n d i v i d u a l  i n  t h e  p r o c e s s ,  t h e  
program manager, shou ld  be g i v e n  " a u t h o r i t y  and r e s o u r c e s  adequa te  t o  e x e c u t e  
e f f i c i e n t l y  t h e  program f o r  which he  i s  r e s p o n s i b l e . "  - 24 /  
The program manager i s  t h e  f o c a l  po in t  o f  U.S. Government and i n d u s t r y  
i n t e r a c t i o n  i n  t h e  development and p roduc t ion  of a  p a r t i c u l a r  weapon system. 
He i s  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  decis ionmaker ,  a c t i n g  w i t h i n  t h e  broad guidance g iven  t o  
him, on t h e  t e c h n i c a l  and f i n a n c i a l  a s p e c t s  of t h e  e n t i r e  program -- n o t  
o n l y  t h e  end product  but  a l s o  s p a r e s  and s u p p l i e s ,  maintenance p rocedures ,  
and t r a i n i n g  of pe rsonne l .  
The e f f o r t  t o  enhance programmanager c l o u t  i s  in tended  t o  a c h i e v e ,  among 
o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  g r e a t e r  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  f o r  curb ing  c o s t  growth i n  weapons 
sys tems.  Th is  e x p e c t a t i o n ,  however, f a c e s  two d i f f i c u l t i e s .  F i r s t ,  program 
24 /  U.S. Department of Defense.  Deputy S e c r e t a r y  of Defense.  I n t e r n a l  
menordandun d a t e d  A ? r i l  30, 1981  ,.. , op. c i t . ,  p .  2 (memo). 
manager c a r e e r s  a r e  l i n k e d  t o  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e s ,  where c o s t  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  a r e  s u b o r d i n a t e d  t o  t e c h n i c a l  performance and d e l i v e r y  sched- 
u l e .  Unless  m i l i t a r y  o f f i c e r  promotion c r i t e r i a  a r e  changed t o  p r o t e c t  
managers from a d v e r s e  e v a l u a t i o n s  a r i s i n g  from unpopular  d e c i s i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  
weapons programs, i t  i s  u n r e a l i s t i c  t o  expec t  a n  e l e v a t e d  l e v e l  of c o s t  
c o n s c i o u s n e s s  on t h e i r  p a r t .  A 1979 GAO s t u d y  on c o s t  growth u n d e r s c o r e d  
t h e  p r e s s u r e s  on programmanagers  t o  downplay c o s t  f a c t o r s  i n  t h e i r  d e c i s i o n s .  
It r e p o r t e d  t h a t :  
Weapons o p e r a t i o n a l  performance and d e l i v e r y  performance 
a r e  paramount i n  t h e  minds of DOD program managers and 
d i r e c t o r s ,  and t h e i r  c a r e e r s  r i d e  on t h e s e  p r i o r i t i e s .  
These f a c t o r s  g e n e r a l l y  overshadowed c o s t  c o n c e r n s  and ,  
s i n c e  DOD p r i o r i t i e s  a r e  u s u a l l y  made q u i t e  c l e a r  t o  a  
c o n t r a c t o r ,  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  h a s  r e a s o n  t o  rank  produc- 
t i v i t y  improvement and c o s t  r e d u c t i o n  a s  s u b o r d i n a t e  
o b j e c t i v e s  . - 25/
Second, program managers a r e  handicapped by s h o r t  t o u r s  o f  d u t y .  Manag- 
i n g  a  major  weapons a c q u i s i t i o n  program i s  a  complex and demanding ass ignment  
t h a t  r e q u i r e s  more t h a n  a  y e a r  t o  g a i n  f a m i l i a r i t y  w i t h  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  and 
i s s u e s .  Ye t ,  program managers -- l i k e  o t h e r  m i l i t a r y  o f f i c e r s  -- a r e  r o u t i n e l y  
r e a s s i g n e d  a t  t h e  end of  two o r  t h r e e  y e a r s  and r e p l a c e d  by new, r e l a t i v e l y  
i n e x p e r i e n c e d  o f f i c e r s .  C u r r e n t l y ,  t h e  average  t o u r  i s  abou t  3 y e a r s ,  w h i l e  
t h e  a v e r a g e  development t ime  of  a  program i s  between 8 t o  15 y e a r s ,  w i t h  
major  a c q u i s i t i o n  m i l e s t o n e s  o c c u r r i n g  approx imate ly  e v e r y  4 y e a r s .  Such 
s h o r t  t o u r s  o f  d u t y  n o t  o n l y  f a i l  t o  t a k e  advan tage  of  e x p e r i e n c e  and c o n t i n -  
u i t y ,  b u t  a l s o  r e s u l t  i n  t h e  d i l u t i o n  of a c c o u n t a b i l i t y .  By t h e  t i m e  m i s t a k e s  
25/ U.S. General  Accounting O f f i c e .  Impediments t o  Reducing t h e  Cos t s  -
of  Weapons Syst*ms, op.  c i t . ,  p. 8. 
nave been uncovered,  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  them h a s  been r e a s s i g n e d  
t o  a n o t h e r  p o s t .  
Many w i t n e s s e s  i n  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  h e a r i n g s  have s t r e s s e d  t h e  need f o r  
more competent and d e d i c a t e d  peop le  i n  t h e  ranks  of program managers.  
Norman August ine  h a s  urged t h a t  a l l  members of t h i s  group be r e q u i r e d ,  
p r i o r  t o  t h e i r  ass ignment ,  t o  r e c e i v e  t r a i n i n g  a t  t h e  Defense Systems 
Management Col lege  and t o  s e r v e  one t o u r  a s  a  depu ty  program manager. 
Fur thermore ,  he b e l i e v e s  program managers shou ld  be kep t  i n  p l a c e  l o n g e r  
t h a n  t h r e e  y e a r s .  26/  -
Some c r i t i c s  have c a l l e d  f o r  l e g i s l a t i v e  and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a c t i o n ,  
t o  p rov ide  n e c e s s a r y  c a r e e r  i n c e n t i v e s  and p r o t e c t i o n .  Others  i n s i s t  t h a t  
t h e  o n l y  way t o  g u a r a n t e e  an adequa te  c a d r e  o f  program managers i s  t o  employ 
c i v i l i a n s  i n  t h e  key p o s i t i o n s .  
' No o t h e r  e lement  i n  c u r r e n t  WD e f f o r t s  t o  c u r b  c o s t  over runs  more 
c l e a r l y  r e f l e c t s  t h e  i n h e r e n t  dilemmas and d i f f i c u l t y  of  reforming t h e  acqu i -  
s i t i o n  p rocess  than  t h e  e f f o r t  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  program managers'  r o l e .  
I n  1969, Deputy S e c r e t a r y  of Defense David Packard,  much l i k e  h i s  s u c c e s s o r  
i n  l a t e r  y e a r s ,  Frank C a r l u c c i ,  moved t o  upgrade t h e  q u a l i t y  of program 
managers by i n c r e a s i n g  t h e i r  a u t h o r i t y  and p r e s t i g e .  The Packard i n i t i a t i v e  
f a i l e d  t o  t a k e  r o o t .  It seems l i k e l y ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  t h e  p r e s e n t  e f f o r t  t o  
s t r e n g t h e n  program managers w i l l  depend f o r  i t s  s u c c e s s  n o t  s o  much on fo rmal  
d e c l a r a t i o n s  of  i n t e n t  a s  on c o n c r e t e  a c t i o n s  t aken  t o  n e u t r a l i z e  t h e  
--------------- 
2 6 1  Augus t ine ,  op.  c i t . ,  p .  28/ .  -
unsympathet ic  c o n d i t i o n s  t h a t  c o n t i n u e  t o  dominate t h e  management o f  PM 
c a r e e r s .  Such n e u t r a l i z a t i o n  would g i v e  program managers,  a s  a  g r o u p ,  a  
b e t t e r  chance t o  g a i n  t h e  exper ience ,  a u t h o r i t y ,  and i n c e n t i v e  t o  e x e r c i s e  
e f f e c t i v e  l e a d e r s h i p .  
2. Decrease  Emphasis on High Technology 
The p u r s u i t  of new technology has  long  been a  d r i v i n g  f o r c e  behind t h e  
U.S. weapons a c q u i s i t i o n  p rocess .  The emphasis on h i g h  r i s k  t e c h n o l o g i e s  
o f t e n  r e s u l t s  i n  l eng then ing  d e l i v e r y  schedu les  and i n c r e a s e d  c o s t s .  The 
United S t a t e s  has sought t o  compensate f o r  i t s  i n f e r i o r i t y  i n  numbers com- 
pared wi th  t h e  Sov ie t  Union by p rocur ing  h i g h  q u a l i t y  and h i g h  performance 
weapons. While few would a r g u e  w i t h  t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  need t o  m a i n t a i n  i t s  
t e c h n o l o g i c a l  edge,  i n c r e a s i n g  numbers o f  d e f e n s e  a n a l y s t s  have expressed  
concern  o v e r  what t h e y  c o n s i d e r  t o  be e x c e s s i v e  r e l i a n c e  on h i g h  t echnology .  
One of t h e  most c r i t i c a l  examinat ions  of t h e  high- technology i s s u e  i s  
c o n t a i n e d  i n  a  s t u d y  by  WD's  F r a n k l i n  C .  Spinney t i t l e d  "Defense F a c t s  o f  
L i f e . "  27/  H i s  t h e s i s  i s  t h a t  t h e  i n c r e a s i n g  complex i ty  of weapons h a s  l e d  
t o  s h a r p l y  r i s i n g  c o s t s  which, i n  t u r n ,  have had a n  immediate e f f e c t  on t h e  
number of weapons t h a t  can be a f f o r d e d .  The d e c l i n e  i n  numbers produced i s  
accompanied by a  second e f f e c t ,  namely, a  d e c l i n e  i n  performance r e l i a b i l i t y .  
There a r e  so many complex and r e l a t i v e l y  u n t e s t e d  subsystems invo lved  t h a t  
m a l f u n c t i o n s  occur  f r e q u e n t l y .  
2 7 1  Spinney, F r a n k l i n  C. Defense F a c t s  of L i f e .  [ S t a f f  paper  p repared  
f o r  i n t e r n a l  u s e ,  V.S. Department of Defense] .  December 5 ,  1980. 56 p .  
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Spinney and o t h e r s  have emphasized t h e  p a r t i c u l a r l y  d e v a s t a t i n g  e f f e c t  
on c o s t  of  what i s  d e s c r i b e d  a s  t h e  " l a s t  f i v e  p e r c e n t  syndrome." I n  t h e  
h e a r i n g s  conducted by t h e  S p e c i a l  Pane l  on Defense Procurement P rocedures ,  
s e v e r a l  o f  t h e  w i t n e s s e s  s t r e s s e d  t h e  p o i n t  t h a t ,  g e n e r a l l y ,  t h e  l a s t  5 
p e r c e n t  improvement i n  a s y s t e m ' s  performance may r e s u l t  i n  a  30 t o  50 p e r c e n t  
i n c r e a s e  i n  i t s  c o s t .  They a l l  ag reed  t h a t  d e d i c a t i o n  t o  such  a  h i g h  l e v e l  
of  p e r f e c t i o n  was, i n  most c a s e s ,  e x c e s s i v e  and i n d e f e n s i b l e .  C r i t i c i s m  of 
t h e  m i l i t a r y ' s  h i g h  t echno logy  emphasis i s  t h u s  n o t  an  argument a g a i n s t  
t echno logy  i t s e l f ,  b u t  a g a i n s t  a n  extreme devo t ion  t o  i t  t h a t  a g g r a v a t e s  
problems o f  a f f o r d a b i l i t y  and r e a d i n e s s .  
The Genera l  Accounting O f f i c e  h a s  i d e n t i f i e d  t h e  U.S. 's  h i g h  t echno logy  
p o l i c y  a s  no t  on ly  a  major c o n t r i b u t i n g  f a c t o r  t o  t h e  c o s t  over run  problem, 
bu t  p o s s i b l y  even t h e  s i n g l e  most impor tan t  c o s t  d r i v e r .  I t s  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  
how t h i s  o c c u r s  i s  summarized a s  fo l lows :  
The d r i v e  f o r  g r e a t e r  c a p a b i l i t y  u s u a l l y  means complex 
e l e c t r o n i c s ,  a v i o n i c s ,  f i r e  c o n t r o l  sys tems ,  and so  
f o r t h ,  t h a t  keep adding t o  t h e  c o s t  i n  t h r e e  ways. 
F i r s t ,  t h e  r e s e a r c h ,  development and t e s t  c o s t s  a r e  
d r i v e n  up by t h e  need t o  d e s i g n ,  t e s t ,  and i n t e g r a t e  
t h e  complex subsystems t o  make them a l l  work t o g e t h e r  
t o  do t h e  job t h a t  i s  d e s i r e d .  Secondly ,  t h e  c o s t  
of  p rocur ing  t h e s e  i t e m s  f o r  p roduc t ion  i s  ex t remely  
h i g h ,  pushing t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  c o s t s  way up. T h i r d ,  and 
probably  t h e  g r e a t e s t  c o s t ,  i s  t h e  h i g h  maintenance 
and s u p p o r t  c o s t s  o f  t h e  deployed s y s t e m ' s  complex 
equipment.  These c o s t s ,  which can  be many t imes  t h o s e  
o f  a c q u i s i t i o n ,  a r e  o f t e n  over looked d u r i n g  t h e  
a c q u i s i t i o n  c y c l e .  - 28/  
--------------- 
28/  U.S. General  Accounting O f f i c e .  Impediments t o  Reducing t h e  Cos t s  
of weapons Systems,  op.  c i t . ,  pp. 8-9. 
The high- technology emphasis of  t h e  U.S. d e f e n s e  community has  been 
recogn ized  f o r  many y e a r s .  I n  t e s t i m o n y  b e f o r e  t h e  Congress i n  l a t e  1971,  
W i l l i a m  B. McLean, t e c h n i c a l  d i r e c t o r  of t h e  Naval Undersea C e n t e r ,  San 
Diego,  C a l i f o r n i a ,  d e c l a r e d  t h a t  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  p r o c e s s  rewarded t h e  
d e s i g n  of complex and expens ive  sys tems and p e n a l i z e d  work on s i m p l e r  a n d ,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  l e s s  expens ive  ones .  He c r i t i c i z e d  t h e  b u d g e t a r y  p r o c e s s  i n  
t h i s  c o n t e x t  a s  "a  r i t u a l  wi th  no c o n t e n t . "  291 -
Department of  Defense l e a d e r s ,  however, have r e j e c t e d  such  c h a r a c t e r i -  
z a t i o n s  of  t h e  h i g h  technology i s s u e  a s  " f a c i l e "  and " s i m p l i s t i c . "  They 
r e j e c t  t h e  c o n t e n t i o n  t h a t  s h i f t i n g  away from t h e  p r e s e n t  " s u p e r i o r  q u a l i t y "  
approach i n  weapons a c q u i s i t i o n  would produce s i g n i f i c a n t  c o s t  s a v i n g s .  
Indeed ,  t h e y  a r g u e  t h a t  i t  would most p robab ly  l e a d  t o  a n  o v e r a l l  i n c r e a s e ,  
a f t e r  a l l  o p e r a t i n g ,  s a i n t e n a n c e ,  and s u p p o r t  c o s t s  were computed. A 
t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y  s i m p l e r  sys tem may be cheaper  i n  i s o l a t i o n ,  b u t  t h e  c o s t s  
a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  p r o v i d i n g  a d d i t i o n a l  p e r s o n n e l ,  t r a i n i n g ,  and s u p p o r t  f o r  
t h e  i n c r e a s e d  number r e q u i r e d  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  e q u a l ,  i f  n o t  exceed ,  t h e  
a l t e r n a t i v e ,  t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y  advanced sys tem.  Fur the rmore ,  a s  S e c r e t a r y  
o f  Defense Caspar Weinberger no ted  i n  a September 12 ,  1983 s t a t e m e n t ,  
c r i t i c s  of h i g h  t echno logy  may be s e e n  a s  p u t t i n g  c o s t  s a v i n g s  b e f o r e  
human l i v e s .  - 30/ For example,  i n  combat, c h e a p e r ,  l e s s  s o p h i s t i c a t e d ,  
29/ Weapons A c q u i s i t i o n :  How F a u l t y  i s  Cur ren t  System, C o n g r e s s i o n a l  
~ u a r t z l ~  Weekly Repor t ,  op.  c i t . ,  p. 2616. 
301 Washington P o s t ,  September 13 ,  1983. p. A12. For  a n  a r t i c l e  t h a t  
p r e s e n t s  t h e  arguments i n  f a v o r  of  a  " s u p e r i o r "  t echno logy  approach t o  
weapons a c q u i s i t i o n ,  s e e :  Walker, F o r r e s t  E . ,  J r .  Paradox and F a l s e  Econ- 
omy: M i l i t a r y  Reform and High Technology. Air U n i v e r s i t y  Review. May-June 
1983. pp. 11-23. 
e a s i e r - t o - m a i n t a i n  a i r c r a f t  cou ld  be expec ted  t o  s u f f e r  a  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
g r e a t e r  i n c i d e n c e  o f  a t t r i t i o n .  
I n  h i s  A p r i l  30 ,  1981 memorandum on "Improving t h e  A c q u i s i t i o n  P r o c e s s , "  
t h e n  Deputy S e c r e t a r y  of Defense C a r l u c c i  acknowledged t h e  need t o  change 
D O D ' s  approach t o  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  i n n o v a t i o n .  He s t r e s s e d  t h e  importance  of  
examining e v o l u t i o n a r y  a l t e r n a t i v e s  which u s e  a  lower r i s k  approach t h a n  
s o l u t i o n s  a t  t h e  " f r o n t i e r "  o f  technology.  Th i s  e v o l u t i o n a r y  approach ,  a s  
e x p l a i n e d  i n  v a r i o u s  o f f i c i a l  communications, o f f e r s  an  a l t e r n a t i v e  which 
mimimizes t e c h n o l o g i c a l  r i s k  and maximizes planned upgrading of a l r e a d y -  
deployed subsystems which o f f e r  t h e  g r e a t e s t  b e n e f i t s .  I n  t h i s  manner, 
weapon sys tems  c o s t  may be reduced ,  l e a d  t ime  may be s h o r t e n e d ,  and r e l i -  
a b i l i t y  may be improved. The concept  i s  r e f e r r e d  t o  i n  Defense Department 
c i r c l e s  a s  Preplanned Produc t  Improvement ( P 3 I ) .  - 31/ 
P31  i s  n o t  a n  e n t i r e l y  new i d e a  t o  t h e  U.S. m i l i t a r y .  The approach h a s  
been used i n  t h e  p a s t  w i t h  a v a r i e t y  of  weapon sys tems ,  such a s  t h e  shou lde r -  
f i r e d  a n t i - a i r c r a f t  m i s s i l e  S t i n g e r .  The l a t t e r  was des igned  from t h e  o u t s e t  
t o  a c c e p t ,  a t  a  l a t e r  d a t e ,  a n  advanced gu idance  system n o t  a v a i l a b l e  a t  t h e  
t ime  o f  i n i t i a l  development.  - 32/ 
The major  o b s t a c l e  t o  wider a d o p t i o n  of  t h e  P31 p r i n c i p l e ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  
c r i t i c s ,  h a s  been t h e  mindset  of  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  community - t h e  u s e r s ,  
e n g i n e e r s ,  and c o n t r a c t o r s .  The f i r s t  group,  c o n s i s t i n g  of t h e  uniformed 
31/ U.S. Department of  Defense.  Deputy S e c r e t a r y  of  Defense.  I n t e r n a l  
memorzdum d a t e d  A p r i l  30 ,  1981 ..., op.  c i t . ,  p.  2 ( a t t a c h m e n t ) .  
32! E l k i n s ,  Yar lene  M. P31 -- Help  i n  R e d u c i ~ g  Weapons Systems Cos t s .  
Concepts ,  Spr ing  1982. p .  108.  
s e r v i c e s ,  t e n d s  t o  view requ i rements  i n  terms of d e s i r e d  technology.  I ts  
needs  a r e  d e f i n e d  i n  t e rms  o f  what i s  " b e t t e r "  r a t h e r  t h a n  "good enough." 
The r e s u l t  of t h i s  o r i e n t a t i o n  i s  t h a t  f e a t u r e s  a r e  added t o  a  sys tem i n  
advance of t h e i r  being economical ly  r e a s o n a b l e .  The second group i s  t h e  
e n g i n e e r i n g  community, which g e n e r a l l y  e x h i b i t s  g r e a t  en thus iasm f o r  p u r s u i n g  
t h e  l e a d i n g  edge of technology.  R e p u t a t i o n s  a r e  made on t h e  b a s i s  o f  major  
breakthrough.  Engineers  a r e  t h e r e f o r e  i n c l i n e d  t o  over-design a sys tem,  
e x p e c t i n g  t o  overcome d i f f i c u l t i e s  t h a t  might a r i s e  d u r i n g  t h e  development 
s t a g e .  The t h i r d  group i s  made up o f  de fense  c o n t r a c t o r s ,  whose c o m p e t i t i o n  
l e a d s  t o  p r o p o s a l s  t h a t  push t h e  s t a t e - o f - t h e - a r t ,  s i n c e  i t  i s  w e l l  known 
t h a t  t h e  government i t s e l f  i s  b i a s e d  i n  t h a t  d i r e c t i o n .  - 33/ 
I n  t h e  second year-end rev iew of  D O D ' s  a c q u i s i t i o n  improvement program 
( d a t e d  June  8, 1983), p r o g r e s s  on t h e  i m p l e m e n ~ a t i o n  o f  t h e  3 3 1  e f f o r t s  
was r e p o r t e d .  A number o f  s p e c i f i c  sys tems,  such a s  t h e  JVX t i l t  r o t o r  
a i r c r a f t  and t h e  120mm gun f o r  the M-1 t a n k ,  were c i t e d  a s  ev idence  of t h i s  
p rogress .  It w a s  a l s o  po in ted  o u t  t h a t ,  d u r i n g  t h e  p a s t  y e a r ,  DOD e x e c u t i v e s  
have been examining t h e  15 FY 1983 and 10 FY 1984 new weapon systems program 
s t a r t s  f o r  P31 a p p l i c a t i o n .  I n  t h e s e  programs t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  l a t e r  
i n c o r p o r a t i o n  of new and advanced c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  i s  be ing  b u i l t  i n t o  t h e  
d e s i g n .  The r e p o r t ,  however, open ly  admi t t ed  t h a t  t h e  P31 i n i t i a t i v e  i s  
conf ron ted  by two l i n g e r i n g  problems. These a r e  (1) a p h i l o s o p h i c a l  b i a s  
w i t h i n  DOD and t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  community which impedes f u l l  implementa t ion ,  
I b i d . ,  p. 106. 
and,  ( 2 )  a l a c k  of adequate  i n i t i a l  funding r e q u i r e d  by g r e a t e r  f ront-end 
c o s t s  and p o s s i b l e  performance p e n a l t i e s .  - 341 
3 .  Impose S t r i c t  Repor t ing  Requirements 
The main f o c u s  of c o n g r e s s i o n a l  i n i t i a t i v e  t o  c u r b  t h e  s h a r p l y  e s c a l a t -  
i n g  c o s t  of weapons systems has  been t o  impose more s t r i n g e n t  DOD r e p o r t i n g  
requ i rements .  Two y e a r s  ago many c r i t i c s  cons idered  t h e  c u r r e n t  c o s t  r e p o r t -  
i n g  system, known a s  t h e  S e l e c t e d  A c q u i s i t i o n  Report  (SAR) system,  a s  s e r i -  
o u s l y  i n a d e q u a t e .  It presen ted  each system program manager 's  c u r r e n t  " b e s t  
e s t i m a t e "  of key performance,  schedu le ,  and c o s t  g o a l s ,  compared t h e s e  e s t i -  
mates  wi th  b a s e l i n e  f i g u r e s  e s t a b l i s h e d  a t  t h e  t ime  t h e  program was approved 
f o r  f u l l - s c a l e  development,  and exp la ined  a l l  v a r i a n c e s  from t h e  b a s e l i n e .  351 -
I n  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  h e a r i n g s  w i t n e s s e s  t e s t i f i e d  t h a t  d a t a  i n  t h e  SARs was o f t e n  
o u t  o f  d a t e  and t h a t  p o t e n t i a l  c o s t  growth i n  many programs c o u l d ,  and s h o u l d ,  
be i d e n t i f i e d  much e a r l i e r .  Also ,  i n f o r m a t i o n  was p resen ted  which i n d i c a t e d  
t h a t  DOD was exc lud ing  c e r t a i n  weapons systems from t h e  SAR by d e c l i n i n g  t o  
c l a s s i f y  them a s  "major." 
S t e p s  have been t a k e n  i n  subsequent  months t o  s t r e n g t h e n  and r e f i n e  t h e  
laws governing DOD r e p o r t i n g  requirements .  I n  t h e  FY 1983 DOD A u t h o r i z a t i o n  
Act ,  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  of Defense ' s  l a t i t u d e  a s  t o  which programs were t o  be 
i n c l u d e d  i n  SARs was reduced. He i s  now compelled t o  i n c l u d e  any program 
341 U.S. Department of Defense. Deputy S e c r e t a r y  o f  Defense.  I n t e r n a l  
memorGdum d a t e d  June  8 ,  1983 ..., op. c i t . ,  p. 3  ( a t t a c h m e n t ) .  
351 U.S. Congress ional  Budget O f f i c e .  Sta tement  of d i c e  PI. R i v l i n ,  -
op. c i t . ,  p. 3. 
e s t i m a t e d  t o  r e q u i r e  an  e v e n t u a l  t o t a l  e x p e n d i t u r e  f o r  r e s e a r c h ,  development ,  
t e s t ,  and e v a l u a t i o n  of more t h a n  $200 m i l l i o n  o r  an  e v e n t u a l  t o t a l  expendi-  
t u r e  f o r  procurement o f  more t h a n  $1 b i l l i o n .  Th is  language i s  i n t e n d e d  t o  
e n s u r e  t h e  i n c l u s i o n  i n  t h e  SARs of a l a r g e r  number o f  d e f e n s e  programs a t  
a n  e a r l i e r  s t a g e  i n  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  p rocess  t h a n  h a s  been t h e  c a s e  i n  p a s t  
y e a r s .  g/ 
A d d i t i o n a l  demands were imposed on DOD by t h e  s o - c a l l e d  "Nunn amendment," 
which c r e a t e d  a n  "excep t ion"  r e p o r t i n g  requ i rement  ( i n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  quar-  
t e r l y  o r  " p e r i o d i c "  SARs) f o r  FY 1982. Sponsored by Sena tor  Sam Nunn and 
a t t a c h e d  t o  t h e  FY 1982 DOD A u t h o r i z a t i o n  Act (P.L. 97-86, s e c t i o n  917) ,  t h e  
amendment t o o k  t h e  March 1981 SAR p r o j e c t i o n s  as i t s  b a s e - l i n e  f o r  weapons 
c o s t s .  For any weapon t h a t  exceeded by more t h a n  1 5  p e r c e n t  t h e  p r o j e c t i o n s  
f o r  e i t h e r  ( 1 )  t h e  c u r r e n t  procurement u n i t  c o s t  o r  ( 2 )  t h e  t o t a l  program 
a c q u i s i t i o n  u n i t  c o s t ,  t h e  Nunn amendment r e q u i r e d  t h e  s e c r e t a r y  of t h e  
m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e  buying t h e  weapon t o  g i v e  t h e  Congress a w r i t t e n  r e p o r t  
w i t h i n  30 days  e x p l a i n i n g  t h e  r e a s o n  f o r  t h e  i n c r e a s e ,  t h e  names of t h e  
m i l i t a r y  and c i v i l i a n  o f f i c i a l s  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  program, and a c t i o n s  
t aken  o r  planned t o  c o n t r o l  f u t u r e  c o s t  i n c r e a s e s .  
For any weapon exceeding e i t h e r  o f  t h e  c o s t  t h r e s h o l d s  by more t h a n  25 
p e r c e n t ,  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  Defense a l s o  had t o  c e r t i f y  t o  t h e  Congress w i t h i n  
30 days t h e  m i l i t a r y  n e c e s s i t y  o f  t h e  weapon and i d e n t i f y  a l t e r n a t i v e  sys tems .  
------------ 
36/  U.S. Congress.  House. Department of Defense A u t h o r i z a t i o n  Act of 
1983. Conference Report  [Report  No. 97-7491, 9 7 t h  Congress,  2nd s e s s i o n ,  
August 16,  1982. Washington, U.S. Govt. P r in t . .  Of f . ,  p. 24. 
This  r e p o r t i n g  requirement  was made e f f e c t i v e  f o r  one year  on a  t r i a l  b a s i s .  
The main purpose o f  t h i s  amendment was t o  i n c r e a s e  f u r t h e r  t h e  Congress '  
awareness of c o s t  growth i n  t ime t o  t a k e  a p p r o p r i a t e  a c t i o n .  
I n  more r e c e n t  a c t i o n ,  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  of t h e  o r i g i n a l  Nunn amendment 
were extended i n d e f i n i t e l y  and t h e  u n i t  c o s t  r e p o r t  t r i g g e r i n g  mechanism 
broadened i n  scope and impact .  Following t h e  recommendations of t h e  House's  
S p e c i a l  Pane l  on Defense Procurement Procedures ,  t h e  Department of Defense 
A u t h o r i z a t i o n  Act f o r  FY 1983 con ta ined  language which o b l i g a t e s  t h e  program 
manager f o r  e a c h  major weapon system t o  submit a  r e p o r t  t a  t h e  s e r v i c e  s e c r e -  
t a r y  when t h e r e  i s  reason  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e r e  has  been a  15 p e r c e n t  i n c r e a s e  
i n  c o n t r a c t  c o s t  o r  program u n i t  c o s t ,  Based on t h e  program manager 's  
r e p o r t ,  t h e  s e r v i c e  s e c r e t a r y  i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  submit a  program c o s t  assessment  
r e p o r t  t o  t h e  Congress. The new p r o v i s i o n s  f u r t h e r  r e q u i r e  a d d i t i o n a l  r e p o r t s  
from t h e  program managers and s e r v i c e  s e c r e t a r i e s  f o r  e v e r y  5 p e r c e n t  i n c r e a s e  
above t h e  o r i g i n a l  15 p e r c e n t  c o s t  growth i n  c o n t r a c t  c o s t  o r  program u n i t  
c o s t .  - 37/  The e f f e c t  of t h i s  language is  t o  a p p l y  p r e s s u r e  d i r e c t l y  no t  
o n l y  t o  t h e  t o p  l e v e l  of DOD a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  bu t  a l s o  t o  t h e  lower l e v e l s  of 
management, where i n i t i a l  and key d e c i s i o n s  a r e  made r e g a r d i n g  major sys tems 
a c q u i s i t i o n .  
The S e l e c t e d .  A c q u i s i t i o n  Repor t s  (SARs) and t h e  u n i t  c o s t  e x c e p t i o n  
r e p o r t s  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  major t h r u s t  of r e c e n t  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  a c t i o n  t o  expand 
l e g i s l a t i v e  o v e r s i g h t  of weapons a c q u i s i t i o n  and curb  c o s t  growth. Other  
i n i t i a t i v e s  i n c l u d e  (1) e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of an O f f i c e  of t h e  DOD I n s p e c t o r  
- Genera l  t o  i n i t i a t e ,  conduct ,  and s u p e r v i s e  a u d i t s  and i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  r e l a t -  
i n g  t o  t h e  p r e v e n t i o n  and d e t e c t i o n  o f  f r a u d ,  was te ,  and abuse  i n  t h e  pro- 
grams and o p e r a t i o n s  of t h e  depar tment ;  and ( 2 )  r e q u i r i n g  DOD t o  p rov ide  a n  
annua l  r e p o r t  t o  t h e  Congress on e f f o r t s  t o  improve t h e  f u n c t i o n i n g  o f  i t s  
a u d i t  and i n v e s t i g a t i v e  s e r v i c e s  a s  a  means of reduc ing  was te ,  f r a u d ,  and 
abuse .  g/ 
These r e c e n t  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  a c t i o n s  a r e  s e e n  by many a s  e s s e n t i a l  t o  t h e  
s u c c e s s  of any campaign t o  b r i n g  c o s t  o v e r r u n s  under c o n t r o l .  The l e a d i n g  
r o l e  of t h e  Congress i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  impor tan t  i n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a l e g i t i m a t e  
and e f f e c t i v e  framework f o r  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  throughout  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  pro- 
c e s s .  Thus,  t h e  c u r r e n t  emphasis on weapons c o s t  r e p o r t i n g  s e r v e s  two func- 
t i o n s .  It prov ides  t h e  Congress w i t h  t i m e l y  and a c c u r a t e  i n f o r m a t i o n  upon 
which t o  base  c r i t i c a l  funding and programming d e c i s i o n s .  A t  t h e  same t i m e ,  
i t  underscores  t h e  Congress '  deep concern over  t h e  c o s t  over run  problem and 
i t s  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  t o  see t h a t  something i s  done t o  c o r r e c t  t h e  s i t u a t i o n .  
E. S t a t u s  o f  t h e  Defense A c q u i s i t i o n  Improvement Program 
I n  s u b m i t t i n g  t h e  f i r s t  year-end r e p o r t  on t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  improvement 
program t o  t h e  s e c r e t a r i e s  of t h e  m i l i t a r y  depar tments  and o t h e r s ,  former  
Deputy S e c r e t a r y  o f  Defense C a r l u c c i  expressed  r e s t r a i n e d  optimism. He s a i d  
38/ The Department o f  Defense was n o t  r e q u i r e d  by t h e  I n s p e c t o r  Genera l  
Act o f  1978 t o  e s t a b l i s h  an  O f f i c e  of I n s p e c t o r  Genera l  because  i t  w a s  f e l t  
t h a t  a n  independent  i n s p e c t o r  cou ld  i n t e r f e r e  w i t h  t h e  c h a i n  o f  command and 
p o s s i b l y  compromise n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y .  The Department of Defense Author iza-  
t i o n  A c t  f o r  FY 1983, however, amended t h e  1978 Act t o  p r o v i d e  f o r  a n  Inspec- 
t o r  General  i n  t h e  Department of Defense under t h e  g e n e r a l  s u p e r v i s i o n  of 
t h e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  Defense. 
t h a t  p r o g r e s s  had been made, b u t  " i t  is  a l s o  c l e a r  t h a t  we have some way t o  
go b e f o r e  t h e  32 i n i t i a t i v e s  have become p a r t  of t h e  d a i l y  way of  do ing  
b u s i n e s s  i n  t h e  Department of Defense." - 391  Of p a r t i c u l a r  concern  t o  him 
was t h e  need t o  push down t h e  p o l i c i e s  developed a t  t o p  management l e v e l s  t o  
t h e  working l e v e l  i n  each  s e r v i c e .  Overs igh t  of t h e  implementa t ion p r o c e s s  
was a s s i g n e d  t o  a  permanent A c q u i s i t i o n  Improvement S t e e r i n g  Group, c h a i r e d  
by t h e  Deputy Under S e c r e t a r y  of Defense f o r  A c q u i s i t i o n  Management and 
i n c l u d i n g  as i t s  o t h e r  members t h e  p r i n c i p a l  m i l i t a r y  and c i v i l i a n  a c q u i s i t i o n  
o f f i c e r s .  S i x  working groups  were f o m e d  w'ithin t h e  S t e e r i n g  Group framework 
t o  f o c u s  on 
e f f o r t :  
t o p i c a l  a r e a s  i d e n t i f i e d  a s  key t o  implementa t ion of  t h e  reform 
Program S t a b i l i t y  
Multi-Year C o n t r a c t i n g  
Preplanned Produc t  Improvement 
Cost  Growth 
Suppor t  and Readiness  
Compet i t ion 
Each o f  t h e s e  t o p i c a l  a r e a s  and t h e  i n i t i a t i v e s  i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h  them have 
a n  impac t ,  t o  one degree  o r  a n o t h e r ,  on t h e  c o s t  growth of  weapon sys tems.  
The c o s t  growth working group,  however, was g iven  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  
e i g h t  i n i t i a t i v e s  which, pe rhaps ,  have t h e  most d i r e c t  and immediate impact .  
These i n i t i a t i v e s  f a l l  i n t o  two major c a t e g o r i e s :  t h o s e  which l e a d  t o  more 
r e a l i s t i c  b a s e l i n e  c o s t  e s t i m a t e s  o r  budge t s ;  and t h o s e  which c o n t r i b u t e  t o  
D O D ' s  a b i l i t y  t o  c o n t r o l  a c q u i s i t i o n  c o s t s  through c o n t r a c t  s e l e c t i o n  and 
award. 
--------------- 
3 9 /  U.S. Department of  Defense.  Deputy S e c r e t a r y  o f  Defense.  I n t e r n a l  -
memorandum d a t e d  J u l y  ij, 1982 ..., op. c i t . ,  p. 1 (nemo). 
I n  t h e  second year-end r e p o r t ,  d a t e d  June  8 ,  1983, OSD e x e c u t i v e s  made 
no g e n e r a l  c l a i m s  of s u c c e s s  o r ,  f o r  t h a t  m a t t e r ,  l a c k  o f  s u c c e s s .  It was 
po in ted  o u t ,  however, t h a t  13 of t h e  i n i t i a t i v e s  had been implemented and 
r e q u i r e d  o n l y  p e r i o d i c  moni to r ing .  Nine of t h e  i n i t i a t i v e s  showed v a r y i n g  
degrees  of p r o g r e s s  b u t  r e q u i r e d  f u r t h e r  implementing a c t i o n  by t h e  O f f i c e  of 
t h e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  Defense and s e r v i c e  s t a f f s .  The r e p o r t  a l s o  i d e n t i f i e d  s i x  
major a r e a s  t h a t  would r e c e i v e  t h e  p e r s o n a l  a t t e n t i o n  and emphasis of t h e  new 
Deputy S e c r e t a r y  of Defense,  W. Pau l  Thayer. These s i x  a r e a s ,  i d e n t i f i e d  
below, were chosen because t h e y  were ' thought n o t  o n l y  t o  be t h e  most c h a l l e n g -  
i n g  of t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  improvement program i n i t i a t i v e s ,  bu t  a l s o  t h e  ones  
t h a t  he ld  t h e  most promise of s i g n i f i c a n t  c o s t  s a v i n g s .  - 401 
- Program s t a b i l i t y  
-- Economic p roduc t ion  r a t e s  
-- Mult i -year  procurement 
-- R e a l i s t i c  budge t ing  
-- Readiness  and suppor t  
-- Encouraging c o m p e t i t i o n  
Meaningful measurement of t h e  r e s u l t s  o f ' t h e  c o s t  growth i n i t i a t i v e s ,  as 
w e l l  a s  many of t h o s e  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  t h e  o t h e r  t o p i c a l  a r e a s ,  i s  d i f f i c u l t  
a t  t h i s  r e l a t i v e l y  e a r l y  s t a g e .  It w i l l  t a k e  a n o t h e r  y e a r  o r  two, i n  t h e  
o p i n i o n  o f  most knowledgeable o b s e r v e r s ,  b e f o r e  s u f f i c i e n t  ev idence  becomes 
a v a i l a b l e  t o  permit  any k i n d  o f  r e l i a b l e  assessment .  
401 U.S. Department o f  Defense.  Deputy S e c r e t a r y  o f  Defense.  I n t e r n a l  
memorandum d a t e d  June  8 ,  1983 ..., op. c i t . ,  p. 41 ( a t t a c h m e n t ) .  
However, s k e p t i c i s m  i s  q u i t e  widespread even now because ,  a s  many s e e  
i t ,  s u c c e s s f u l  implementat ion of t h e  i n i t i a t i v e s  w i l l  r e q u i r e  e x t r a o r d i n a r y  
management a c t i o n  on a  wholesa le ,  s y s t e m a t i c  b a s i s .  It i s  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
b a r r i e r s  t o  j u s t  such a c t i o n  t h a t  have produced war iness ,  i f  no t  o u t r i g h t  
pessimism. One s e n i o r  member of i n d u s t r y  exp la ined  i n  an  i n t e r v i e w  t h a t  
s i m i l a r  i n i t i a t i v e s  had been in t roduced  by p rev ious  Admin is t ra t ions  b u t ,  a s  
soon a s  t h e  p l a y e r s  who p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  t h e  reform e f f o r t  l e f t  government 
s e r v i c e ,  t h e  o l d  b u r e a u c r a t i c  p r o c e s s  and p e r s p e c t i v e  took over  and t h i n g s  
ended up back where they  s t a r t e d .  Others  concur wi th  t h e  o b s e r v a t i o n  made by 
Leonard S u l l i v a n ,  a  former h i g h  l e v e l  Department of Defense c f f i c i a l ,  t h a t  
t h e  b ig  problem with  a c q u i s i t i o n  reform i s  t h a t  " i t  h a s  a  n a t u r a l  p e r i o d  f a r  
l o n g e r  t h a n  t h e  a t t e n t i o n  span of e i t h e r  t h e  Congress o r  t h e  appo in ted  exec- 
u t i v e  under t h e  P r e s i d e n t . "  - 4 1 /  
--------------- 
411 Grading t h e  C a r l u c c i  D i r e c t i v e :  An I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  Leonard S u l l i v a n  
on 1mZoving t h e  Defense A c q u i s i t i o n  Process .  Armed Forces  J o u r n a l ,  August 
1981, p. 38. 
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IV. INCENTIVES AND ACCOUNTABILITY: AN APPRAISAL 
A. Performance and Profit as Paramount Considerations 
In reviewing DOD's and industry's role in the acquisition process, it 
is hard to find evidence that their basic outlook is sympathetic to giving 
cost reduction top priority. While not indifferent to measures of cost, 
since higher costs often translate into fewer "buys," the first order of 
priority for the military is to achieve and maintain a technological edge. 
Presumably, this is an orientation that the public should not only expect, 
but encourage, in those who are assigned responsibility for defending U.S. 
security interests. Similarly, industry's preoccupation with profit and its 
tendency to charge whatever the traffic will bear is not a new development. 
Not only do key W D  and industry personnel view the acquisition process 
with relative indifference to the system's ultimate cost, they also tend to 
support and reinforce each other's institutional attitudes and interests. 
Thus, the incidence of military personnel, particularly those with exper- 
ience and knowledge of systems acquisition, finding employment with private 
contractors upon retirement is high. 42/ At the same time, defense industry -
has been the source of recruitment for many individuals who have occupied key 
421 Reed, Leon S. Military Maneuvers: Analysis of the Interchange of 
~ersozel between Defense Contractors and the Department of Defense. New 
York, N.Y., Council on Economic ?riorities, 1975. 55 D. 
government p o s i t i o n s  connected w i t h  ueapons- development and p roduc t ion .  The 
n e t  r e s u l t  i s  what some a n a l y s t s  s e e  as a n  environment i n  which c o s t  r e d u c t i o n  
r e c e i v e s  low p r i o r i t y  a t t e n t i o n  compared t o  performance and p r o f i t .  To expec t  
i n d i v i d u a l s  i n  DOD o r  i n d u s t r y  t o  a c t  o t h e r w i s e  on a  v o l u n t a r y  and unsuperv i sed  
b a s i s  may w e l l  be n a i v e  and u n r e a l i s t i c ,  g iven  human n a t u r e .  Thus, a r g u a b l y ,  
any m o d i f i c a t i o n  of t h e i r  o r i e n t a t i o n  and behavior  i n  r e g a r d  t o  s t a n d a r d s  o f  
performance and r e t u r n  on investment  would probably have t o  be imposed by a n  
e x t e r n a l ,  h i g h e r  a u t h o r i t y .  
B. Congress iona l  Motives and R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  Examined 
That h i g h e r  a u t h o r i t y ,  of c o u r s e ,  e x i s t s  i n  t h e  Congress,  wi th  i t s  l e g i s -  
l a t i v e  o v e r s i g h t  and a p p r o p r i a t i o n  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  However, t h e  mot ives  of 
t h e  Congress r e g a r d i n g  weapon systems a c q u i s t i o n  a r e  mixed and many. Arguments 
i n  f a v o r  of c o s t  r e d u c t i o n  can be a t  odds w i t h  o b l i g a t i o n s  t o  c o n s t i t u t e n t s  a s  
w e l l  a s  t o  p rov ide  f o r  t h e  n a t i o n ' s  s e c u r i t y .  There a r e  few Members who do 
n o t  have i n  t h e i r  d i s t r i c t ,  o r  s t a t e ,  d e f e n s e  i n d u s t r i e s  and a  s u b s t a n t i a l  
l a b o r  f o r c e  dependent on doing b u s i n e s s  wi th  t h e  U.S. Government. Given t h e s e  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  t h e r e  has  n o t  been a  g r e a t  d e a l  of i n c e n t i v e  i n  t h e  p a s t  t o  
c h a l l e n g e  u n r e a l i s t i c a l l y  low e s t i m a t e s  on weapons c o s t s  provided by DOD and 
i n d u s t r y .  The s i t u a t i o n  may have changed, however, because of t h e  r e c e n t  
r e c e s s i o n  and accompanying budgetary  problems. 
The depressed  economy and u n s e t t l e d  f e e l i n g s  of t h e  e l e c t o r a t e  may combine 
t o  a c t  a s  a major s t i m u l u s  t o  reform of t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  p rocess .  It i s  t h i s  
e x t e r n a l  environment t h a t  most d i s t i n g u i s h e s  t h e  p r e s e n t  reform e f f o r t  from 
p a s t  ones and p rov ides  some b a s i s  f o r  o p t i z i s m  abou t  :he outccme. By making 
c o s t  consc iousness  a h i g h  p r i o r i t y  concern t h a t  can compete f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t i m e  
on even t e rms  w i t h  performance and p r o f i t ,  t h e  r e c e s s i o n  may have opened t h e  
door  t o  c o n s t r u c t i v e  change and e v e n t u a l  success .  
C. HOW t o  Ensure C o n t i n u i t y  o f  t h e  Cos t  C o n t r o l  E f f o r t  
The expanded r e p o r t i n g  requ i rements  l e v i e d  on DOD by t h e  Congress have 
done much t o  s t r e n g t h e n  i t s  o v e r s i g h t  r o l e .  By making i t  c l e a r  t h a t  weapon 
systems c o s t  i s  go ing  t o  be moni tored more c l o s e l y ,  a g r e a t e r  d e g r e e  o f  
d e t e r r e n c e  h a s  been i n t r o d u c e d  i n t o  t h e  p r o c e s s .  Congress a l s o  h a s  begun t o  
u t i l i z e  more e x t e n s i v e l y  t h e  s e r v i c e s  of t h e  General  Accounting O f f i c e  and ) 
/! 
/ 
t h e  Congress iona l  Budget O f f i c e .  A t  t h e  u rg ing  o f  t h e  Congress,  CBO h a s r  1 
e s t a b l i s h e d  a c o s t  e s t i m a t i n g  u n i t  t o  rev iew on a c o n t i n u i n g  b a s i s  t h e  quar-  i,, 
t e r l y  S e l e c t e d  A c q u i s i t i o n  Repor t s  submi t t ed  by DOD. Other  c o s t  over run  ,' _.- 
reform i n i t i a t i v e s  might a I s o  b e n e f i t  from s i m i l a r  s c r u t i n y  from l e g i s l a t i v e  
agenc ies .  p o t e n t i a l  c a n d i d a t e s  f o r  t h i s  k i n d  o f  s p e c i a l  a t t e n t i o n  might  be 
a weapon system technology g r a u p  ( i n  t h e  O f f i c e  of Technology Assessment) 
and a program manager c a r e e r  e v a l u a t i o n  group (GAO). If l e g i s l a t i v e  b ranch  
a g e n c i e s  do n o t  seem t o  be a p p r o p r i a t e  f o r  such m o n i t o r i n g ,  t h e n  g roups  
might be  formed w i t h i n  one of t h e  p r i n c i p a l  o v e r s i g h t  committees.  
No a r e a  of i n t e n d e d  reform c o n f r o n t s  more b a r r i e r s  t o  s u c c e s s  t h a n  t h a t  
i n v o l v i n g  D O D ' s  program managers. How does  one h o l d  t h e  program manager 
accountab le  f o r  t h e  r i s i n g  c o s t  of t h e  sys tem f o r  which he  has  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ?  
What k i n d s  of i n c e n t i v e s  a r e  needed t o  o f f s e t  s e r v i c e  a f f i l i a t i o n  and o t h e r  
f a c t o r s  t h a t  push concern f o r  c o s t  i n t o  t h e  background? The r o l e  of t h e  
program manager p rov ides  a key i l l u s t r a t i o n  of D O D ' s  d i f f i c u l t y  i n  re fo rming  
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t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  p rocess .  The t r e n d  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  has  been toward c e n t r a l -  
i z a t i o n  o f  a u t h o r i t y ,  wi th  t h e  r e s u l t  being a system with  m u l t i p l e  l a y e r s  o f  
review and micro-management. I n  t h e  c a s e  of program managers, t h e  evidence 
s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e r e  has  been a d i s t i n c t  d imin i sh ing  of t h e i r  s e n s e  o f  respon- 
s i b i l i t y ,  s i n c e  a l l  major d e c i s i o n s  about a program were made by someone a t  
a h i g h e r  l e v e l .  Accordiag t o  t e s t imony  i n  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  h e a r i n g s ,  program 
managers were encouraged t o  become " l e a n e r s , "  a c c e p t i n g  t h e i r  l a c k  of 
c o n t r o l  and t a k i n g  comfort  i n  t h e  widespread d i f f u s i o n  of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  
The Reagan Admin is t ra t ion  has  begun t h e  p rocess  of r e v e r s i n g  t h i s  
p o l i c y  by emphasizing t h e  d e l e g a t i o n  of g r e a t e r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  program 
managers. While d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  i s  a necessa ry  s t e p  i n  making program 
managers more e f f e c t i v e ,  i t  may no t  be s u f f i c i e n t  by i t s e l f .  It does n o t  
e l i m i n a t e  Goncern, f o r  example, over  t h e  program managers '  c l o s e  t i e s  t o  
t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e s  and t h e i r  a b i l i t y  t o  e x e r c i s e  independent  
judgement. Var ious  s o l u t i o n s  t o  t h i s  l a t t e r  problem have been proposed,  
among them being t h e  fo l lowing :  (1) p r o t e c t  m i l i t a r y  program managers so  
t h e y  can a c t  independen t ly  o f  t h e  s e r v i c e s  wi thout  r i s k  t o  t h e i r  c a r e e r s ;  
( 2 )  employ c i v i l i a n s  i n  t h e  p o s i t i o n  of program manager a s  means o f  circum- 
v e n t i n g  t h e  above problem; and (3) a t t a c h  rank ing  c i v i l i a n s  t o  work a l o n g s i d e  
t h e  m i l i t a r y  program managers t o  keep a n  eye on c o s t  -- " c o s t  c o n t r o l  commis- 
s a r s . "  Each s o l u t i o n  r e q u i r e s  fundamental  changes which have been opposed 
s t r o n g l y  by t h e  s e r v i c e s .  
Given t h e  g r e a t  number of p l a y e r s  involved i n  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  p r o c e s s ,  
s u c c e s s  ii? c o n ~ r c l l i n g  c o s t  over runs  w i l l  r e q u i r e  no t  o n l y  an i n t e n s i v e  
commitment of s t a f f  r e s o u r c e s ,  bu t  a l s o  p e r s i s t e n t  follow-up e f f o r t s  a t  
.. - 
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r o o t .  For t h e  c u r r e n t  a c q u i s i t i o n  re fo rm e f f o r t  t o  be s u c c e s s f u l ,  t h e r e  
would a lmost  c e r t a i n l y  have t o  be major changes i n  b o t h  o r g a n i z a t i o n  and 
p r o c e s s .  These changes ,  i n  t u r n ,  would r e q u i r e  t h e  h i g h - l e v e l  a t t e n t i o n  and 
long-term s u p p o r t  of both  DOD o f f i c i a l s  and members o f  t h e  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  
o v e r s i g h t  committees.  
D.  Is There Need f o r  More Fundamental S t r u c t u r a l  Change? 
There  a r e  a n a l y s t s  who b e l i e v e  t h a t  o n l y  major  s t r u c t u r a l  change i n  t h e  
U.S. Government's procedure  f o r  buying weapons w i l l  s o l v e  t h e  problem of  
c o s t  over runs .  Thus f a r ,  advoca tes  of s t r u c t u r a l  change have tended t o  
f o c u s  on D O D ' s  o r g a n i z a t i o n  a l o n e  -- w i t h  t h e  aim of i m p a r t i n g  g r e a t e r  objec-  
t i v i t y  and e f f e c t i v e n e s s  t o  i t s  weapons-buying o p e r a t i o n s .  Examples of t h i s  
o r i e n t a t i o n  and i t s  r e s u l t s  a r e  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t h e  Cost  A n a l y s i s  Improve- 
ment Group (1973) and t h e  Defense Resources Board (1979).  - 431 Other  more 
r e c e n t  examples a r e  (1) t h e  d e s i g n a t i o n  of "compet i t ion  advoca tes"  by t h e  
m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e s  and t h e  Defense L o g i s t i c s  Agency i n  o r d e r  t o  promote com- 
p e t i t i o n  i n  weapons c o n t r a c t s ,  and ( 2 )  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t h e  O f f i c e  of 
t h e  DOD I n s p e c t o r  General  t o  p rov ide  a more c e n t r a l i z e d  and s t r o n g e r  a u d i t  
and i n v e s t i g a t i v e  c a p a b i l i t y .  
C u r r e n t l y ,  a number of o t h e r  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  i n i t i a t i v e s  a r e  be ing  pur- 
sued t o  f u r t h e r  improve t h e  DOD a c q u i s i t i o n  p r o c e s s .  A p r o v i s i o n  of t h e  
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43/ The Defense- Resources Board was c r e a t e d  t o  e n s u r e  more e f f e c t i v e  
i n t e g E t i o n  of s e r v i c e  program o b j e c t i v e s  and DOD budget c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  
Membership comprises  t h e  Deputy S e c r e t a r y  o f  Defense a s  Chairman p l u s  o t h e r  
t o p  DOD c i v i l i a n  managers, and a  s e n i o r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  from t h e  O f f i c e  of 
Xanagement and Budget. The o n l y  m i l i t a r y  d e l e g a t e  t o  t h e  Board i s  t h e  JCS 
Chai m a n .  
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DOD f i s c a l  y e a r  1984 a u t h o r i z a t i o n  a c t  - 44/  c r e a t e s  an  independent  o f f i c e  t o  
o v e r s e e  t h e  o p e r a t i o n a l  t e s t i n g  and e v a l u a t i o n  of  new weapons. The o f f i c e ,  
headed by a  c i v i l i a n  d i r e c t o r ,  w i l l  have broad powers t o  d e s i g n  and approve 
t e s t  p r o c e d u r e s ,  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  t o  b u i l d  v a r i o u s  weapons, 
and r e p o r t  t o  t h e  Congress on any t h a t  do n o t  perform w e l l .  I n  i t s  r e p o r t  
cover ing  t h e  management of  t h e  Defense Department,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ' s  P r i v a t e  
S e c t o r  Survey on Cost  C o n t r o l  has  urged t h a t  t h e  m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e s  be s t r i p p e d  
o f  much o f  t h e i r  weapons-buying a u t h o r i t y  and t h a t  t h i s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  be 
a s s i g n e d  t o  a newly c r e a t e d  p o s i t i o n  of Under S e c r e t a r y  of Defense f o r  Acqui- 
s i t i o n  Management. Such a s t e p  would h e l p ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  r e p o r t ' s  explan- 
a t i o n ,  t o  e l i m i n a t e  "massive d u p l i c a t i o n "  i n  weapons purchases .  It would 
a l s o  p rov ide  f o r  g r e a t e r  management independence and o b j e c t i v i t y  throughout  
t h e  e n t i r e  a c q u i s i t i o n  c y c l e .  
These examples do n o t  axhaus t  t h e  l i s t  of  proposed s t r u c t u r a l  changes 
aimed a t  s t r e n g t h e n i n g  t h e  way DOD buys weapons. Almost a l l  c u r r e n t  i n i t i -  
a t i v e s ,  i t  shou ld  be n o t e d ,  s h a r e  a  common t r a i t ,  namely, t h e i r  r e s t r i c t e d  
scope.  L i t t l e  o r  no a t t e n t i o n  h a s  been d i r e c t e d  a t  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  need f o r  
more sweeping s t r u c t u r a l  change,  such  a s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  s h i f t i n g  t h e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  a c q u i s i t i o n  management from t h e  m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e s  t o  a 
c i v i l i a n - o p e r a t e d  supp ly  agency.  
The c i v i l i a n  s u p p l y  agency concept  i s  one t h a t  has  s u r f a c e d  p e r i o d i c a l l y  
i n  t h i s  c o u n t r y ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  d u r i n g  t h e  f i r s t  h a l f  of t h e  p r e s e n t  c e n t u r y .  
--------------- 
5 4 /  P.L. 98-34, s i g c e d  i x c o  law by i h e  P r e s i d e c t  on September 2 4 ,  1383. -
